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ABSTRACT 
The main body of this thesis presents the results of research examining two major 
urban policies operating on Tyneside, a conurbation in the North East of England, in 
the early 1990s - Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and City Challenge. 
The research examines in detail the ways in which Tyne and Wear Development 
Corporation and North Tyneside City Challenge have addressed the twin issues of 
community participation and community benefit. Examination of the Tyneside area 
demonstrates the long temri effects of industrial decline and central government's 
continued public policy response; UDCs and City Challenge are significant recent 
examples. 
There is a large body of literature which focuses on the related issues of industrial 
decline, urtDan deprivation and public policy response. Some of this literature has 
highlighted the limited ability of urban policy to ameliorate many of the problems found 
within the inner city. More recently, commentators have argued that urban policy 
should address the social needs of local communities directly and not, as many recent 
urban initiatives have, concentrate almost exclusively on the physical regeneration of 
derelict areas. 
Whilst official output measures published by the Department of Environment 
suggest, in general, that UDCs and City Challenge authorities are successful in 
meeting their objectives, meaningful evaluation must examine the 'outcomes' of policy 
and not concentrate solely on the physical 'outputs'. With this in mind, a framework 
has been adopted which incorporates two key concepts required to evaluate urban 
policy in a meaningful way - community participation and community benefit. This 
framework focuses analysis on people and local communities, rather than simply the 
physical outputs of policy. By using the concepts of community participation and 
community benefit in evaluating urban policy initiatives, this thesis demonstrates the 
limitations of the UDC and City Challenge models when addressing the needs of 
deprived local communities. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is mainly the result of research which was undertaken as a Research 
Assistant on a project examining 'Urban Development Corporations, Community 
Participation and Community Benefit' in the Department of Sociology and Social 
Policy, University of Durham. The project was co-ordinated by Dr Fred Robinson 
and undertaken between September 1991 and June 1993. As well as publishing a 
major report on the research findings, a number of articles have also been written and 
have appeared in a variety of academic and public policy journals. In addition to 
infomiation collected through the UDC project, continuing research was undertaken 
through my previous employment as a Development worker working on TWDC's 
Royal Quays site on North Tyneside. Working in close contact with Tyne and Wear 
Development Corporation and also North Tyneside City Challenge has given me a 
great appreciation of how these policies operate 'on the ground'. 
The research was carried out on Tyneside, a conurbation centred on the river Tyne in 
North East England. The main aim of the research was to examine Tyne and Wear 
Urban Development Corporation (TWDC) and North Tyneside City Challenge 
(NTCC) and their attempts to address the twin issues of community participation and 
comrpunity benefit. It was decided to use these concepts in order to examine, in 
detail, how contemporary urban policy is addressing the needs and demands of inner 
city communities. It has become increasingly apparent that urban policy is limited in 
the degree to which it can change, or address, problems within the inner city. By 
adopting this framework the research examines and highlights the outcomes of policy 
with reference to local people, rather than physical output measures. 
I would like to thank, in the first instance, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and 
the Baring Foundation, for funding the research project at Durham. I am also grateful 
to the many and varied people who have allowed me to interview them over the 
past three years, without whom this thesis would not have been possible. I would 
also like to thank Jill Tate for typing this thesis. Most of all, I would like to thank Dr. 
Fred Robinson for providing me with an opportunity to work on such a major project, 
by helping me develop my interest in research and for his sustained guidance and 
constnjctive comments in the writing up of this thesis. 
MARTY LAWRENCE - UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM - SEPTEMBER 1995 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The inner city is the social antipodes of middle class Britain, a 
universe apart, an alien world devoid of almost every feature 
of an ideal environment. It is the place where all our social ills 
come together, the place where all our sins are paid for. The 
inner city is now, and is likely to remain, Britain's most dramatic 
and intractable social problem. For here are concenti:ated the 
worst housing, the highest unemployment, the greatest 
density of poor people, the highest crime rates and, more 
recently, the most serious threat posed to established law and 
order since the Second Worid War. And yet it is not a peculiar, 
exceptional problem. For all the deprivations found 
concentrated in the inner city are widespread throughout the 
country, strongly present in the peripheral Northern and Celtic 
regions, and in scattered pockets almost everywhere. The 
inner city is therefore a microcosm of deprivation, economic 
decline and social disintegration in Britain today. It is not only a 
particular sort of place on the map but a symbol and 
summation of the dark side of a whole society'. 
(Hamson, 1983, p21) 
People were drawn to the fast growing cities as the Industrial Revolution progressed 
in the eariy nineteenth century and new sources of employment became 
concentrated in areas where natural resources could be easily exploited. As towns 
developed into cities, and people moved from rural to new 'urban areas', problems 
associated with overcrowding, poor sanitation and poverty began to emerge to 
concentrations and levels of intensity not witnessed before. Substantial public 
policy action to ameliorate urban problems began in the mid nineteenth century with 
attempts to combat public health problems; and public policy has since remained a 
significant element shaping the urtDan economy and society. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of business, industry and 
population were located in cities - Britain had undoubtedly become an urban based 
society. Public policy action within the city was still preoccupied with health issues, 
forming the basis for town planning and housing programmes, though subsequently 
the policies of the inter war years shifted attention and concern to economic policy 
issues. 
Long term deindustrialisation in the primary and heavy engineering sectors 
particularly affected areas that relied heavily upon shipbuilding, iron and steel 
production and associated engineering trades (eg Glasgow and Newcastle). This 
had severe implications for cities that developed in response to demands for coal, 
steel and especially on Tyneside - shipbuilding. 
The late 1960s witnessed the first tentative steps by the government to address 
problems evident in the city in a spatial fonn. This was the beginning of 
'contemporary urban policy'. Since the emergence of urban policy in 1968, 
govemments have developed numerous policies aimed at tackling the inner city 
problem. The 'problem' has now long been identified and accepted; however, the 
reasons for it and the solutions to it have changed significantly over the years. This 
has not only been apparent between governments of differing political persuasions, 
but also within single party terms of office - most significantly 1979 -1995. 
The publication of the 1977 White Paper 'Policy for the Inner Cities', signalled the 
emergence of permanent inner urban intervention (Lawless, 1989, p39) and remains 
today the only White Paper published on the problems affecting the older cities and 
potential solutions that might be introduced to address them. Some two years later a 
Conservative administration was elected that began to develop many new inner city 
projects. Conservative urban policy continued the search for coordination - echoed 
by urban projects in the 1970s - though pursued this ideal in a modified form. Two 
other important urban themes emerged during the 1980s - deregulation and 
liberalisation. The Conservative administration argued that 'the govemment has 
created a climate which supports enterprise and has set about removing obstacles in 
the way of inner city recovery' (Action for Cities, 1988, p2). One theme in particular, 
development, became increasingly central to Conservative urban policy during the 
1980s. Of the twelve initiatives announced in the 1988 'Action for Cities' programme, 
eight were within the 'general sphere of development' (Lawless, 1989, p75). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, and after sixteen years of Conservative govemment, 
two major urban policies exist. Established some ten years apart, and developed to 
address urban distress in two very different ways, they now face similar calls for 
efficiency, effectiveness and issues such as community participation and community 
benefit. 
Uriaan Development Corporations (UDCs) were established in 1980 by the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act and since then UDCs have commanded tiie 
majority of public expenditijre on urban policy (Imrie and Thomas, 1993). UDCs, 
established as quangos by the Department of the Environment (DoE), were 
favoured greatly by such contrasting figures as Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 
1979 -1992) and Michael Heseltine (past Secretary of State for tiie DoE and cun-ent 
Deputy Prime minister). Many critics have argued that UDCs are preoccupied with 
land and property development and rely too heavily on the vagaries of the property 
market (CLES, 1992). They have, nevertheless, remained the central plank of British 
urban policy over the past sixteen years. 
Some eleven years after UDCs were inb-oduced, Michael Heseltine (returning for a 
second time to the DoE as Secretary of State) introduced a new urtDan initiative -
City Challenge. City Challenge (as witti UDCs) is a spatially targeted policy but 
resource allocation to City Challenge is based upon a 'competitive bidding 
approach'. Within City Challenge local authorities have to bid for resources to 
regenerate particular urtDan areas. City Challenge offers local authorities the potential 
to become players in local urtDan regeneration again (denied them during much of tiie 
1980s) and gives local communities tiie potential to become partners in tiie 
regeneration of their areas. Unlike UDCs, City Challenge places the issues of 
community participation and community benefit as cento-al to the task of regeneration. 
Although the majority of urtDan policy initiatives are centi-ally sanctioned, each 
particular project will operate within, and will reflect, tiie political culture and economic 
history of that area. It is therefore difficult to compare and contrast initiatives across 
the country because of differing economic fortunes and political attitudes in the 
regions. However, within the North East of England, Tyneside (a conurtDation based 
around the river Tyne) has operating within its area botii major urtDan policy 
initiatives - a UDC operating along the riverside strips of the Tyne (and, additionally, 
the Wear) and two City Challenge initiatives, in the West End of Newcastie and in a 
densely populated urban area in North Tyneside. 
Moreover, in historical terms Tyneside provides an interesting case study; it has 
suffered long temi economic decline associated with the contraction of the major 
indusb-ies In the area and has been, for a considerable lengWi of time, the focus of 
public policy action aimed at reversing tills economic decline. Having the two most 
important urban policies operating in tiie same vicinity not only provides an excellent 
opportunity to examine these policies individually, but also allows a comparison to 
be made between the two within the same social and economic context. 
Since the emergence of contemporary urban policy important lessons have been 
learnt about the effects such action can have. It is now widely accepted that tiiere is 
no 'quick fix'; action needs to be long temi. Additionally, it is now considered 
expedient to involve many agencies in ttie implementation of policy; 'Partnership' has 
become a central concept in 1990s urban policy (see Town and Country Planning, 
June, 1993). This tiiesis examines two key issues of urban policy in the 1990s -
community participation and community benefit. Consideration will be made of tiie 
policy background to UDCs and City Challenge, their progress and achievements 
since establishment and the ways in which these relate to tiie issues of community 
participation and community benefit. 
This thesis arises out of a personal interest in economic decline, urban decay and 
policy intervention, and the ways in which these processes have worked 
themselves out in certain locales. It is based upon documentary research drawn from 
a wide variety of sources - the media, academic journals, books and government / 
official publications. In addition to this a series of interviews was undertaken with a 
variety of local actors - policy officials, Councillors, the voluntary sector and 
community groups - which provides invaluable information on local issues. I have 
also gained a detailed understanding of the issues through my recent employment 
with a community organisation on Tyneside, and this has been exti-emely useful in 
analysing much of the information generated tiirough the research. 
Chapter Two begins by exploring the emergence of the inner city problem and what 
characterises it in today's society. The remainder of the chapter looks at a key 
element of central government s response to the problem - urtDan policy - and charts 
its development from the late 1960s to the present day. 
Chapter Three outlines the evolution of Tyneside from the eariy 1800s to tiie 
pinnacle of economic achievement in tiie era immediately before Worid War One. This 
Chapter then goes on to consider the reasons for the subsequent decline and 
examines central government policy response to ttie problem since the 1930s. 
Finally, the present economic, social and policy context of Tyneside will be 
established. 
The majority of Chapter Four is dedicated to a discussion of the progress and 
achievements of two major urban policies in tiie area - Tyne and Wear Development 
Corporation (TWDC) and North Tyneside City Challenge (NTCC). Assessment is 
made of the job creation records of the two organisations and conclusions drawn 
concerning their overall ability to create employment. 
Chapter Five deals specifically with the twin issues of community participation and 
community benefit. This Chapter examines the ways in which the two organisations 
have consulted local communities, and tiie extent to which tiiis has led to 
participation. Chapter Five also examines the record of the two organisations in 
respect of community benefit and outiines the major activities that TWDC and NTCC 
have engaged in in pursuit of this objective. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
establishing whether or not the two organisations have achieved meaningful 
community participation and also if their activities have benefited local communities. 
Chapter Six draws together the evidence discussed throughout the thesis and 
provides a final evaluation of the success of tiie two urtDan policies in respect of 
community participation and community benefit. This Chapter ends by developing a 
policy framework that govemment might adopt to provide a new direction to utban 
policy that directiy targets people, rather tiian the areas they live in. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE INNER CITY PROBLEM AND POLICY RESPONSE 
Britain's cities have long been the focus of public policy action and political debate. 
From the development of cities as centi-es of commerce and industry in the nineteentii 
century to them being perceived as a problem today, public policy has had an 
intimate relationship with the city, and in particular the.inner city. 
Policy responses to the 'inner city problem' have varied over the years. Public policy 
action in the city was originally aimed at tackling health problems. Post 1945 
governments invested heavily in slum clearance schemes and policies aimed at 
moving people out of the city (see Donnison and Soto, 1980). Whilst it would be 
correct to note that general policies of modernisation (for example in housing) do have 
a substantial uriDan impact, ttie emergence of a policy aimed at spatially targeting 
action has only occurred in tiie past 25 years. 
The emergence of urtDan policy at the end of tiie 1960s was in response to the 
rediscovery of poverty, and an understanding tiiat the Welfare State had failed to 
eradicate many of the problems it was established to address. Whilst urtDan policy 
has changed significantly over the past 25 years, the issues it was designed to 
address have remained fairly constant, although they have intensified. 
This chapter explores, firstiy, the emergence of the 'inner city problem' and what 
characterises it in modern society. The analysis then goes on to examine central 
government's response to the problem in the late 1960s. The second part of the 
chapter examines the policies developed by ttie Labour govemment (1974 -1979) 
and the current Conservative administration (1979 - 1995), highlighting major themes, 
changes in policy direction as well as outiining the urtDan initiatives that are in 
operation today. 
During the mid nineteenth century cities began to grow at a pace previously 
unknown, generating economic wealth, for some, in an age of free market economic 
liberalism. The city became the centre of indusfrial activity, attracting commerce, tt-ade, 
but most importantly people, to areas where natural resources could be exploited by 
new industrial processes. However, as cities expanded poverty, squalor and 
disease emerged as serious problems and although open sewers, polluted water 
supplies and high rates of infant mortality were commonplace, neither factory owners 
nor local authorities regarded action as necessary (Ward, 1989). It was not until tiie 
eariy 1860s (and the death of the Prince Regent from typhoid in 1861) that public 
health came to be regarded as a matter for public policy intervention. Public 
autiiorities, which had previously regarded action as 'sinful interference' (Ward, 1989, 
p2), became engaged in public regulation and municipal activity, providing sanitation 
and modest levels of public service. 
Since the 1860s, British cities have been subject to public policy action; indeed, 
modern town planning originated from the 19tii century concern witii public health 
problems. However, severe 19th century health problems were tempered by two 
positive features in wider society; one, the economy was largely buoyant and 
expanding; two, there was widespread political hope (Faith in the City, 1985). 
Today, society is quite different. The British economy has entered into a second 
major recession in the space of thirteen years, and shows only modest levels of 
recovery whilst political hope has been replaced by a perception that govemment 
can effect only minor change via public policy action. At tiie end of the 20th CentiJry 
not only Is tiie political and economic environment radically different from the late 
nineteenth century, but so too are the problems that are found witiiin the cities. 
During the 19th century health problems were ttie major concem and were addressed 
by the provision of better standards of housing, sanitation and public services. 
Today, the problems of the city, and in particular the 'inner city', are far more complex 
and directly linked to economic decline. 
The Contemporary 'Urban problem' 
Many deprived areas share essential characteristics; they tend to be based around 
an old port (eg Liverpool, Cardiff) or a manufacturing area connected to an outinoded 
staple industry or industrial process (eg Sheffield, Newcastie) and have higher ttian 
average unemployment rates (Hall, 1981). But, deprived areas may be near the 
centre of a conurbation, like Elswick or Walker in Newcastie, or be spatially displaced 
peripheral housing estates like Meadow Well in Nortii Tyneside (Byrne, 1989). 
Whatever, the 'inner city problem' exists in two forms, spatial and social. Spatially, 
there are geographical areas tiiat compare unfavourably to the rest of the city and to 
other cities. Socially, there are communities, be they unemployed people, ethnic 
minorities or single parent families, who suffer fi-om higher incidences of 
unemployment and poverty (see Han-ell and Peterson, 1992). 
The inner city problem can be a misleading concept as economic and social 
inequalities are not confined to urtDan areas, or even inner urtDan areas. Problems of 
deprivation and unemployment exist in 'prosperous' as well as 'depressed' regions, 
and indeed, many smaller towns have experienced 'urtDan' problems normally 
associated witti larger cities. Economic and social inequalities are, though, 
concentrated in certain areas where deprivation is highly visible. Many of society's 
disadvantaged groups are found in these 'inner city areas'. Altiiough similar 
circumstances exist elsewhere, most notably on peripheral housing estates: '..tiie 
large cities do represent concentrations of deprivation of a size and intensity not 
found elsewhere' (Robson, 1988, p42). Three common problems are cleariy 
apparent tfiat can be considered as constituting the 'inner city problem': economic 
decline, physical decay and social disintegration (Faith in the City, 1985). 
Many of ttie problems of Britain's inner cities have their roots in a shift in tiie nature of 
Britain's industiial base. The period 1951 to 1981 saw over one million manufarturing 
jobs lost In the inner areas of the six largest urtDan areas in Great Britain (Audit 
Commission, 1989), and whilst the same period witnessed a large increase in service 
sector employment, this did little to compensate for the types of jobs lost in 
manufacturing. As manufacturing employment decreased employment was 
reorganised away from major conurtDations to other areas - between 1960 and 1981 
the major conurtDations lost 43% of manufacturing jobs; small towns lost only 1% and 
rural areas gained 24% (Lawless, 1989, p29). Unemployment has emerged as a 
major problem in urtDan areas, labour supply and demand has become unbalanced 
so that many of the white collar jobs remaining in the city cores are taken by 
commuters from the suburiDS, whilst deprived communities, who actually live in the 
inner areas, suffer from higher than average unemployment rates. Indeed, as Hasluck 
(1987) demonsti-ates, unemployment has become a centi-al featijre of the inner city 
problem (see Fainstein etal, 1992). 
Physical decay is possibly the most visible sign of the inner city problem and is 
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particulariy evident in the state of inner city housing stock. Many of the dwellings in 
the inner city are older and in a greater state of disrepair due, in part, to an over 
enttiusiastic pursuit of owner occupation generated by the Conservative govemment 
in the 1980s and the growing scale of disrepair in the local authority housing sector. 
Central govemment cutbacks in public spending have increasingly affected inner city 
areas where reliance upon the provision of public service is heavy. Indeed, it has 
been argued that 'for tiie most part opportunities for jobs, for housing and for the 
desired amenities of social services, shopping, schools and leisure have shifted out 
of tiie industrial city...the inner city is increasingly the territory of those left behind...' 
(Faith in the City, 1985, p8). A lack of decent local shopping facilities, leisure cenfres 
and community resources, evident in many inner city areas combine with, and 
exacerbate, the impact of unemployment and economic decline. 
Migration of people out of the city has always been selective and inevitably the city 
reflects the pressure of such movements. Whilst the poor and disadvantaged may 
not be exclusively concento-ated in urban areas, there has been a relative polarisation 
of the poor in tiie inner city and many of these bear the brunt of economic change 
(Hausner, 1987). On a number of factors, the inner city compares unfavourably with 
ottier areas. In terms of healtti, inner city residents suffer from higher rates of infant 
mortality and lower life expectancies than people in suburijan or airal areas (Black 
Report, 1980). In terms of crime, violence and vandalism, incidences in inner areas 
are consistentiy higher than elsewhere. Whilst the urban riots of 1981 and 1985 
brought widespread attention to the issues of the inner city, govemment did little to 
address the fundamental problems that caused tiie situation. The riots '..undoubtedly 
reflected genuine economic disti-ess...' but also demonstrated '..hati-ed felt by black 
and white youths towards tiie Police as emblems of an alien authority' (Robson, 
1988, p37). Not surprisingly, tiie latter aspect atti-acted ttie most media attention (see 
Campbell B, 1993). 
Inner cities lie at the centte of an unequal society and suffer from economic, social and 
environmental distt^ess. Migration, not only of people but business, employment and 
industry is increasingly away from the older urban cores. Social polarisation between 
the inner city and elsewhere is deepening. Today, tiie only demographically buoyant 
element in ttie inner city are ethnic minorities, who now form significant parts of inner 
city populations. Such groups have brought a degree of enterprise back into the 
inner city, though insufficient to compensate for the wittidrawal of capital in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Whilst physical decay and social disintegration are constituent parts of what is 
considered the urtDan problem, one must not lose sight of tiie central Importance of 
economic decline. Not only does economic decline have an immediate effect -
unemployment - but it also precedes and modifies other symptoms of decline such as 
the physical quality of housing stock (Lawless, 1989). Economic decline, 
unemployment and racial confiict (already evident in tiie United States in the 1950s) 
became serious problems for the British governments of tiie late 1960s and eariy 
1970s. Concem was increasing over the rising unemployment rate in ttie cities and 
questions concerning the ability of the Welfare State to eradicate poverty were being 
expressed (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1965). Many of these issues prompted both 
Harold Wilson's government of 1964 -1970 and Edward Heatii's administration of 
1970 -1974 to initiate investigations into uriDan areas. These 'urtDan experiments' 
aimed to identify ttie causes of, and solutions to, the problems of the inner city. 
The Urban Experiments and Labour Urban Policy 
The eariy 'urtDan experiments' were established to explore specific problems of city 
life and helped to uncover the vast scale of the urtDan problem. Reports from these 
enquiries dispelled attitudes towards urtDan poverty held by governments in the 
1960s and were extremely infiuential in establishing a context for debate. Reports 
produced by Seebohm (1968), Milner - Holland (1965) and Plowden (1967) argued 
that particular problems were prevalent in certain areas and that action should be 
directed toward specific localities. These conclusions were further strengthened by 
work conducted by the many Community Development Projects, which operated in 
deprived urtDan areas in the 1970s, and reported on tiie concenti-ation of certain 
problems within specific localities. 
Whilst the mid 1960s witnessed the first tentative steps made toward developing a 
specifically urtDan policy, it was the 1977 White Paper 'Policy for tiie Inner Cities' and 
the 1978 Inner Areas Act that marked the emergence of pennanent inner city policy 
(Lawless, 1989). The 1977 White Paper and the 1978 Act signalled a much greater 
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commitment to tackling urban problems; resources allocated to urban policy were 
increased and the Department of the Environment assumed responsibility for urban 
policy from the Home Office. 
The 1977 White Paper drew upon many of the conclusions established by the 
previous urban experiments, commenting upon tiie serious nature of economic 
decline, physical decay and deteriorating social conditions that were becoming 
prevalent in the inner areas of cities. The White Paper contended ttiat whilst 
problems in the inner city were not peculiar to it, ttiey were of a level and intensity 
that warranted special attention. In ttie White Paper it was argued that multiple 
deprivation in some inner areas was affecting all of the residents, even when the 
majority of people were in employment and living in satisfactory accommodation. 
Multiple deprivation arose from a sense of neglect and decay, low standards of 
community facilities and high exposure to crime; the White Paper thus identified tiie 
need for an area based initiative. There had to be positive discrimination made in 
favour of the inner cities for public policies and programmes: 'The White Paper...laid 
great stress...on the need to use main policies and programmes of centt-al and local 
govemment in the full in order to tackle the problems of inner areas effectively' (Faith 
in the City, 1985, pi 71) and the govemment attempted to 'bend' existing programme 
expenditure - most notably Rate Support Grant and fransport expenditure - to give 
increased assistance to inner city authorities. In addition to 'bending', ttie White Paper 
argued for special efforts to be focused on a few cities. As a result of procedures 
governing Urban Programme funding and powers contained in the 1978 Inner Areas 
Act, local authorities were divided into three main categories for financial assistance 
under the UrtDan Programme. The three tiers established were: at the top. Partnership 
Authorities (7); then Programme Authorities (15); and other designated disti-icts (19). 
The Partnership Authorities, of which the Gateshead / Newcastle Partnership is an 
example, were the first major inner city policy initiative in England. They were, 
however, relatively pooriy resourced, highly bureaucratic devices that found great 
difficulty in implementing an approach based upon coordination and cooperation. 
Aside from the designation of urban local authorities into a hierarchical structure, the 
other main policy development outiined by the 1977 White Paper was the revamping 
of the resources provided tiirough the Urbar\ Programme (UP). The UP was originally 
created in 1968 and ran, largely unchanged, until 1977. The main preoccupation of tiie 
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UP before 1977 was the funding of social schemes. After 1977 tiie UP remit was 
widened to include industrial, environmental and recreational projects; this new 
emphasis reinforced the belief, expressed in the White Paper, ttiat economic decline 
was centiral to the urtDan problem. As the remit widened, the resources increased from 
£30m in 1977 /1978 to approaching £100m in 1978 /1979. But, 'bending' of 
mainstream resources was largely ineffective and although ttie financial size of the 
UP was increased, cities lost more resources tiirough mainsti-eam spending cuts. This 
led to the firm conclusion that 'Labour's urtDan policy cannot be perceived as anything 
other than meagre' (Lawless, 1989, p50). 
The Conservative govemment elected in 1979 had radically different intentions for 
inner urtDan policy. The new Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael 
Heseltine, sidelined local authorities who had previously played a significant role in 
urtDan regeneration; although the new govemment supported two policies initiated by 
Labour (Urban Programme and Partnerships) tiiey were modified to fit in witti ttie new 
agenda promised by the Conservative govemment. 
Conservative Urban Policy : 1979 - 1995 
Since the eariy 1980s there has been little change in the definition of what constitutes 
the urtDan problem. Crime, social deprivation, poverty and unemployment have 
become generally accepted characteristics of tiie inner city problem. However, the 
conventional wisdom on the reasons for, and solution to, the problem have 
significantiy changed in the past 20 years. 
The basic causes of the inner city problem are still regarded as economic, associated 
with industrial decline. In the 1970s the decline of the city was blamed on low levels 
of investment in the cities alongside high levels of disinvesfrnent; the private sector 
was seen as centi'al to the problem although the public sector was also to blame 
through a lack of competency and policies advocating decenfi-alisation. By the 1980s 
the 'blame' had shifted. The private sector, who were previously regarded as the 
problem, now came to be seen as the most appropriate means for regenerating the 
city. Local authorities, on the other hand, which tiie 1977 White Paper regarded as 
the 'natural agencies to tackle inner city problems', were viewed as the reason for 
many of the cities' inadequacies. Blame for contemporary urtDan problems has been 
12 
transferred from the private sector, and to a lesser degree central government, to the 
cities themselves, the people who live there and the 'entrepreneurially stifling" local 
authorities. 
This 'sea change' in the perceived causes of the urban problem over the past 15 
years is clearly evident when comparing the 1977 White Paper and the 
Government's 'Action for Cities' brochure published in 1988. The White Paper looked 
to the local authorities as the medium for action, stressing the need for a wide range of 
social, environmental and economic programmes. Action for Cities, on the other hand, 
places heavy emphasis on the role of business in urban regeneration; the 
government appears to believe that "what's good for business is good for the cities 
and all who live in them' (Robinson, 1989, p7). Local Authority intervention is only 
acceptable in urban regeneration if business is helped; the forming of 'public / private 
partnerships' had increased dramatically in the 1980s to fulfil this task (see Shaw, 
1990; Town and Country Planning, June, 1993). 
At the end of the 1980s, Action for Cities appeared to have achieved widespread 
acceptance (more a matter of pragmatic acceptance that the Government was in 
control), even amongst once radical authorities such as Sheffield and Liverpool, yet it 
is clear that, 'Action for Cities....was designed to co-ordinate existing approaches and 
not to introduce new initiatives or resources' (Lawless, 1989, p i 42). At the end of the 
1980s an accepted framework of attack had emerged for urban regeneration, 
consisting of three main strands; one, only the private sector can truly regenerate the 
inner city; two, economic concerns must take precedence over social policies and 
aims; and three, property is vitally important in leading the process of urban economic 
development (Robinson, 1989). In order to achieve these objectives the 
Conservative government has developed six new initiatives aimed at regenerating 
urban areas and is now running down the Urban Programme, established by Labour 
in 1967 and revamped in 1977. 
Urban Policies 
There are many problems in identifying what inner city policy constitutes, indeed, 
'...we [the government] have two basic levels of inner city policy. One is the 
application in the cities of policies which apply across the whole country....Then 
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there are policies aimed specifically at designated parts of the cities...' (Action for 
Cities, 1988, p8). Action for Cities casts the financial net equally as widely, claiming 
that total urban policy spending added up to some £3,000m in 1988. This list included 
schemes that directly assisted small businesses, the Training Agency's Youth 
Training Scheme and also a series of general policies in education and housing. 
Whilst the Govemment regarded Action for Cities as 'a whole package of 
measures...its initiatives cover every conceivable area of policy relating to the 
cities...' (Trippier, 1989), the Audit Commission viewed central govemment 
programmes to assist urban regeneration as 'a patchwork quilt of complexity and 
idiosyncrasy. They baffle local authorities and business alike' (Audit Commission, 
1989; see Hambleton, 1993). 
Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that only urban policies impact on the inner 
cities, it is equally misleading to suggest that national policies which cover the whole 
country can be considered as having a predominantly urban impact. It is clear that 
many policies do have an urban impact, but they do not specifically address the 
central issues of concem within the inner cities. In this sense, they cannot be 
regarded as urban policies. Urban policy must be considered as policy that is directly 
targeted on the inner city. 
If we consider urban polices to be those policies that are spatially targeted on the 
inner city, then the list becomes significantly smaller than that found in Action for 
Cities. There are a number of small scale initiatives in areas such as education (City 
Compacts) and crime prevention (Safer Cities) that are, admittedly, targeted on the 
city, but offer only very limited support in temis of both finance and overall impact. 
With this in mind the list of significant and truly urban policies becomes relatively 
small. 
Urban policies administered by the DoE represent the central plank of the 
Government's response to the inner city problem. Outlined below is a list of current 
initiatives, briefly describing their aims, objectives and levels of funding. 
Urban Development Corporations; the Government has 
described the UDC programme as the most important attack ever 
made on urban decay' and has placed UDCs 'at the forefront of the 
Government's drive to revitalise the inner cities' (Action for Cities, 
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1988, p7). UDCs are quangos (quasi autonomous non govemmental 
organisations) with centrally appointed non elected boards and are 
able to override local authority power in the area they are charged with 
regenerating (Cooke, 1989). In 1993 / 1994 UDCs received over 40% 
of all resources allocated to urban policy (DoE, 1994b). The major 
focus of UDC action has been on land and property development, 
though there have been concessions by some UDCs to include more 
socially orientated issues. Thirteen UDCs now exist in England and 
Wales; UDCs receive the lion's share of urban policy resources. 
Expenditure 1993/1994-£380m Estimated 1994 / 1995 -
£291m 
City Challenge; City Challenge, to a degree, marks a departure from 
the urban policies of the 1980s. This Initiative aims to target DoE inner 
city and housing resources on certain local authorities selected 
through a bidding process. Authorities are required to produce 'Action 
Plans' that demonstrate imaginative and innovative approaches to 
regeneration. If they are successful in the bidding process they are 
allocated £37.5m over a five year period. Thirteen pacemaker 
authorities were invited to bid in the 1991 competition of which eleven 
were selected, including Newcastle upon Tyne. North Tyneside was a 
successful bidder in 1992. There are now 31 City Challenge 
authorities. City Challenge offers the potential for local communities to 
become partners in the regeneration of local areas. All the resources 
allocated via City Challenge have been lop sliced' from existing urban 
initiatives. 
Expenditure 1993/ 1994-£223.2m Estimated 1994 / 1995 -
£213m 
English Partnerships (Urban Regeneration Agency); English 
Partnerships (defined in statute as the Urban Regeneration Agency) is 
a body promoting regeneration and development of vacant, derelict and 
contaminated land and buildings throughout England. English 
Partnerships became responsible for Derelict Land Grant, English 
Estates and City Grant from April 1994. The new body will assemble, 
plan and service sites and provide financial support to encourage others 
to proceed with development (see Whitney, 1994; Keyes, 1994). 
Expenditure 1994 / 1995 - £250m 
The Urban Programme; this programme provides funding for the 57 
urban local authorities (previously Programme and Partnership 
authorities) who prepare annual Inner Area Programmes for the DoE. 
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The UP grant aided some 9,900 individual projects in 1991 - 1992 with 
the objectives of creating healthy economies, encouraging enterprise 
and new business and improving people's job prospects. The UP was 
inherited by the current government but has changed to focus on 
economic based schemes as opposed to social ones (see Hall, 1981; 
Stewart and Undenwood, 1980). Resources allocated to the UP have 
recently been cut back. No new schemes are to be funded and the 
programme is to be abolished. 
Expenditure 1993/ 1994-£173.0m Estimated 1994 / 1995 -
£84.9m 
Enterprise Zones; EZs have played an important part in stimulating 
the govemment's attempt to remove state regulations from the private 
sector (Pacione, 1990) and have, through the availability of tax breaks, 
acted as a mechanism for subsidising private sector development. The 
problems and inadequacies of the EZ experiment, attracting investment 
away from urban cores and high job creation costs, have been well 
documented (See Massey, 1982; Lawless, 1986), yet by 1986 63,000 
jobs had been created in the 25 EZs in the country and nearly 5 million 
square feet of floor space had been biiilt. EZs offer exemption from 
rates and the ability to off set all expenditure on industrial and 
commercial buildings against tax. Parts of Newcastle and Gateshead 
enjoyed the benefits of an EZ until 1991; Sunderland currently has an 
EZ designated on St. Peter's Riverside on the north bank of the River 
Wear. Total gross expenditure on EZs in the financial year 1987 /1988 -
the cost of capital allowance was approximately £31 Om and rate revenue 
foregone was £182m tor all zones (Robson, 1994). 
Derelict i^nd Grant; this grant operates nationally but with an urban 
bias, with around a third being spent in urban areas. The grant is 
available for public twdies and private firms to cover 50% -100% of their 
net cost of reclaiming derelict land (after estimating for any increase in 
value attributed to reclamation). Expenditure 1993 / 1994 - £103.9m 
1994 /1995 - Transfen-ed to SRB. 
City Grant; a grant payable directly to the private developer from the 
DoE or UDC (if the project is within a UDC area) (see Cooke, 1989). It 
aims to help private developers undertake land reclamation and 
development and provide them with a satisfactory retum on investment. 
The developer has to demonstrate that the project will not go ahead 
without City Grant assistance; the 'additionality' rule applies. 
Expenditure 1993 /1994 - £23.8m 1994 / 95 - Transferred to SRB. 
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single Regeneration Budget (SRB); the new SRB brings 
together 20 existing programmes, including the resources earmarked 
for the three sponsored bodies supported by the SRB, which include 
Housing Action Trusts, English Partnerships and Urban Development 
Corporations. In 1994 - 1995 the SRB will support the following 
commitments; 
- funding for City Challenge and Urban Programme; 
- £373m for the Estate Action Programme; 
- £88m for Housing Action Tmsts and the establishment of a new one; 
- Derelict Land Grant and City Grant funds t>eing transferred to English 
Partnerships; 
-existing commitments transferring to the SRB under other 
departments' programmes. 
Expenditure 1994 / 1995 - £1.4bn 
Since the election of the Conservative Government in 1979 there has been an 
expansion and restructuring of inner city policies; UDCs, Enterprise Zones, City 
Challenge, City Grant, Single Regeneration Budget and English Partnerships have 
all been designed to have clear 'urban impact' but are based on contrasting 
approaches and philosophies. During the fifteen years of Conservative urban 
policy, three main approaches have been evident; 
- the non interventionist free enterprise policies that deny or minimise the role 
of the public sector, ie Enterprise Zones (that actually emerged as highly 
interventionist); 
- policies based upon partnership and corporatism, ie the Urban Programme; 
- the patronage model, whereby central govemment channels power to local 
intennediaries to perform centrally sanctioned tasks, ie, UDCs and City 
Challenge (Coulson, 1991). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the patronage approach appears to have become the 
dominant model in urban policy. City Challenge is an example of the patronage 
model but differs from other policies in this category (such as UDCs) to a certain 
degree. Whilst City Challenge may be centrally sanctioned and its resources are 
allocated on a competitive bidding approach. City Challenge is also based upon the 
principle of partnership. City Challenge appears to be a mixture of both the 
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patronage and the partnership models. Local Authorities, voluntary and other non 
statutory agencies have to work together in City Challenge. Moreover, Local 
Authorities have the potential of taking the leadership role. Not since the late 1970s 
have local authorities been in this position in urban policy. 
The implementation of City Challenge in 1991, and the introduction of the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) in April 1994, were intended to introduce a degree of 
local detemnination into local economic development. This goes some way to 
redressing the uneven balance inherited from the 1980s, but nevertheless requires 
local authorities and bidding partners to fulfil a set of pre-defined criteria established 
by central govemment. 
A preoccupation with land, buildings and property development - rather than people 
and communities - was characteristic of urban policy in the 1980s (Healey et 
al,1992), and whilst community centred action does continue to be practised at the 
local level, it has increasingly become the province of the voluntary sector (Brownill, 
1990). Whilst urban policy during the 1980s was re - orientated to more economic 
concerns, toward the end of the decade the 'community', as a concept, was used 
more and more frequently by govemment in statements and publications on the inner 
city. Over the past 15 years cento-al government's policy stance has perhaps 
changed rather less than the riietoric. The tone of urban policy language has been 
softened to include the community again; that said, the 'community' may now refer to 
the local private sector as well as the neighbourtiood community. The re - emergence 
of the community dimension in regeneration has been cleariy acknowledged by City 
Challenge authorities; development must benefit local communities and consultation 
mechanisms have been established in many City Challenge areas to achieve this 
goal. 
Efforts to consult local communities over development appears to have been a 
reaction against the harsh criticisms levelled at UDCs in the eariy 1980s that, in 
particular, they were unaccountable at the local level and ignored local needs. In fact, 
the community appears to have been rediscovered much like poverty in the 1980s 
(Robinson, 1989) and if central govemment is to be believed, has become a central 
plank of urban regeneration. However, rhetoric has seldom been matched by 
implementation. Reference to concepts such as 'community', 'participation' and 
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'benefit' in govemment statements is no guarantee for action; has the concept of 
'community' become the central tenant of urban regeneration or is it of only 'symbolic 
importance?' (Robinson,1989). 
The two main urban policy initiatives of the early 1990s, UDCs and City Challenge, 
were both established under very different political environments but are now faced 
with the same pressures calling for community involvement. City Challenge was 
designed with the idea of partnership very much in mind whereas UDCs were 
designed to facilitate the regeneration of land and buildings. But how, and in what 
ways have these very different urban policies reacted to these new pressures? 
Conclusion 
Since the emergence of significant public policy action in the 19th century aimed at 
improving levels of public health, both the problem and the policy response have 
become increasingly complex. The inner city problem is now considered to be both a 
spatial and social issue, affecting people of certain social groups and in certain 
geographical areas. Many of the problems cun-ently manifesting themselves within 
the inner city can be clearly linked to the shift in Britain's industrial base. This 
realignment particulariy affected areas, such as Tyneside, which were reliant on a 
small number of heavy industries. 
Economic decline is of central importance to the inner city problem as it causes 
unemployment and modifies other symptoms of decline, such as physical decay and 
social disintegration. The general buoyancy of the British economy and the post war 
welfare consensus did much to hide the eariy indications of economic decline. The 
urban experiments rediscovered poverty and proved influential in establishing the 
context for debate - that policy should be spatially targeted at the inner city. 
The 1977 White Paper 'Policy for the Inner Cities' and the 1978 Inner Areas Act 
marked the beginning of pennanent inner city policy in Britain (Lawless, 1989). The 
White Paper cleariy recognised that the inner cities suffered from problems of a level 
and intensity not found elsewhere. Nevertheless, Labour's urtDan policy was 
insufficient in both resources and commitment to address the problem. 
19 
Since the 1960s there has been littie change in the definition of what constitutes the 
urtaan problem. That said, in tiie 1980s there was a definite change in what is 
considered to have caused tiie uiban problem; tiie 'blame' has shifted from private to 
public and to a certain extent from centi-al govemment to tiie cities tiiemselves. 
Central govemment now operates a pletiiora of urban initiatives, many based on 
different approaches to urban regeneration, and the two most significant uriDan 
policies today - UriDan Development Corporations and City Challenge - clearly 
reflect this. Botii initiatives are, though, faced with similar calls for equitable 
regeneration, community participation and ultimately community benefit, and have - in 
many ways as a response to their operational and legislative backgrounds -
approached the subject in different ways. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF TYNESIDE 
Tyneside emerged as one of the sti-ongest local economies in Great Britain in the mid 
nineteenth century, producing significant amounts of tiie countiy's share of coal, 
shipping and heavy engineering products. As industry grew, the conurtDation of 
Tyneside was formed, with Newcastie upon Tyne the focal point of the area for both 
commerce and industry. Tyneside continued to be a world force, particulariy in 
shipbuilding, until the 1920s. But the economic decline of Tyneside since this period 
has been as dramatic as its eariier growth. 
This Chapter examines first tiie industrial evolution of Tyneside from the early 1800s 
to the height of economic achievement in tiie years before tiie First Worid War. We 
then go on to discuss and analyse tiie reasons for tiie subsequent decline, with 
particular reference to the major industries in the area. 
The second part of this Chapter examines central govemment policy response to the 
problem since ttie 1930s, highlighting the legacy left by the contraction of the heavy 
industries in the area. Finally, tiie present economic, social and policy context of 
Tyneside is established. 
The Rise of the Local Economy 
The North East of England has an industrial identity based upon the twin pillars of 
coal and iron (House, 1969) and development along the rivers Tyne and Wear has 
been an essential feature of this industrialisation. The vast majority of economic 
development during the 19th Century occun-ed in close proximity to the river Tyne, 
which was tiien the central focus for development. The river Tyne, as seen today, is 
an artificial creation. The Tyne Improvement Act' (1850) marked the beginning of a 
vigorous programme to improve the river; it was straightened, dredged and 
embanked to make it navigable by the worid's largest vessels. Indeed, the 
'enormous expansion of shipbuilding, engineering and coal export was made 
possible by the work of the Tyne Commissioners' (Middlebrook, 1968, p247). As 
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industry developed, the Tyne took on three main roles; first, shipbuilding and ship 
repair; second, the export of coal and coke; and third, the import and export of general 
goods (Mess, 1928). By the 1860s shipbuilding was booming on the Tyne and, in 
subsequent years, the area's heavy industries developed into a worid force. The 
thirty years before the First Worid War witnessed the height of the coal, shipbuilding 
and traditional heavy engineering industries of the North East; coal mining stimulated 
the establishment of iron and steel making, the development of railways, shipbuilding 
and heavy engineering (Robinson, 1992) both on Tyneside and in the rest of the 
North East. 
As the 19th Century progressed the economy of Tyneside became increasingly 
concentrated around three main industries; coal export, shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering. This led to a decline in many of the other local industries, which 
flourished up until 1850, but had either contracted or disappeared altogether by the 
end of the century. As these industries disappeared, the economic base of Tyneside 
became more concentrated. Shipbuilding and engineering activities often became 
interiocked, so that a f i m such as Amristi-ong's, which began primarily as an 
engineering establishment, later took up shipbuilding, and likewise, local shipbuilding 
fimris amalgamated with engineering companies (e.g. Hawthorn Leslie Ltd). Whilst 
many companies successfully expanded during tiie latter half of the 19tii Century, 
only a few industries were concentrated upon which, in turn, led to a dependence on 
a restricted number of markets. Thus'.. . the pre war position of Tyneside was 
precarious. Precarious, because it was so largely based upon a few great 
industries; precarious also, because it depended to such an extent upon the 
demands of foreign countries, which might begin to supply themselves; and 
precarious because so much of the industry was due to the race in armaments which 
could not continue indefinitely' (Mess, 1928). By 1914, approximately two thirds of 
tiie region's working population were employed in coal mining, iron and steel, 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries (Allen, Odber and Bowden, 1957). 
Subsequent difficulties for the region's economy emerged from 'a classic case of tiie 
over commitment tiieory and the dangers of too great a specialisation' (Lee, 1971, 
p i 96). Thus, the eariy successes of private capitalism resulted in a dependence 
upon a few industries which were 'vulnerable to the vicissitudes of ttie market 
economy' (Chapman, 1985). 
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The region's economy became highly susceptible to both cyclical and long term 
fluctuations in demand; a problem that was deepened by the increase in foreign 
competition, dependency on export markets and also a world wide economic slump. 
However, up until 1923, the native industries of tiie North East, particulariy the coal 
industry, remained relatively buoyant compared with the rest of the country. 
Key Economic Sectors 
The coal industry in the North East, certainly after ttie 1890s, became only one of tiie 
many producers supplying coal in the worid market. Increased competition came from 
two main sources; an increase in production from foreign suppliers and tiie opening 
up of new coal fields within Great Britain. Witii tiie size of ttie market rapidly 
decreasing, owing to the economic depression, almost 50,000 jobs were lost in the 
North East coal field between 1924 and 1934 (|y/lcConj, 1979). 
Although national and international competition caused significant difficulties in ttie 
North East's coal fields, problems being faced by many of tiie coal industry's major 
customers exacerbated tiie situation. The main problem was that producing coal for a 
limited number of industries left tiie coal indusby susceptible to any fluctuation in that 
mari<et - for example, tiie shipbuilding industay. By 1932 tiiere had been a virtual 
collapse in the coal market from buyers, botti at home and abroad. As demand 
dropped for coal, the production of iron and steel decreased as well; in 1929 pig iron 
production in the region amounted to 2.8 million tons, but by 1932 this had slipped to 
880,000 tons. As with pig iron, steel production in the region declined as well, from 
2.2m tons in 1929 to 1m tons in 1932. Reductions in botti pig iron and steel 
production led to a significant decrease in the demand for coal locally and this was 
worsened by the overall market situation. After 1932, there was a slow recovery, 
although by 1934 production had yet to regain its 1929 level (McCord, 1979). 
Shipbuilding has contracted significantiy since the Great Depression, but none of 
these reductions, both in temris of labour and output, can be compared with the 
decline evident in the eariy 1930s. By 1931,70.6% of tiie Nortti Easfs shipyard 
workers were unemployed and ttiis figure rose to neariy 80% in 1933; at the national 
scale, the figures were 56.6% and 51.1% respectively. The high levels of 
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unemployment among shipyard workers were not merely reflective of the overall 
national loss, but, in addition, the loss of ttie Nortii East's market share: 'In March 
1930, North East yards had in hand well over a third of the new ships under 
consttuction in British yards; in March 1934 ttie region's share of work in progress 
was down to as little as 10.4%' (McCord, 1979, p219). 
The decline in ship production was part of a national and worid wide collapse in the 
shipbuilding industry, which inevitably had serious knock-on effects for other 
associated industt^ies in tiie North East. Particularly affected were industiies, such as 
the engineering trades, which were highly dependent upon the buoyancy of tiie 
shipbuilding market. The reduction in employment for ttie engineering bBdes, 
between 1929 and 1932, reinforced what was happening in the region's economy. 
In 1929,56,491 people were employed in the engineering trades in tiie Nortti East, 
but by 1932 the figure had dropped to 33,171. The decrease in employment of tiie 
main engineering trades was 41.3%, well above tiie national figure of 23.9%. 
Economic output and unemployment deteriorated to such a great degree tiiat toward 
ttie end of the 1920s, central govemment considered it necessary to begin fomial 
intervention in the distressed regions. 
Government intervention from the Great Depression to the 1970s 
Problems of unemployment dominated the inter war period. It emerged as ttie 
principal economic issue in the North East and dominated ttie developing policy 
debate for conscious economic management (Middleton, 1985). Between 1921 and 
1938 unemployment in the region averaged 14.2% among ttie insured labour force. 
Although the regional problem had long been the subject of attention from central 
govemment (Hallett, 1973), it was not until the inter-war period that there occurred 
both a formal recognition of, and a positive policy towards, disadvantaged regions. 
In 1928, the govemment adopted a significant policy innovation, ttie 'Industi-ial 
Transference Scheme'. This was ttie first attempt made by central govemment to 
ameliorate unemployment in depressed areas, a measure govemment felt obliged to 
introduce in spite of its reluctance to do so. Whilst the Industt-ial Transference Scheme 
was the first attempt by central government to solve unemployment by tiie 
movement of people, the subsequent 'Special Areas Act' (1934) was the first policy 
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aimed at directly helping depressed areas by bringing work to the workers. The 
eariy emphasis of moving people to jobs had been replaced by legislation aimed at 
bringing jobs to people; removing surplus labour had given way to direct assistance. 
The limited financial committnent to the 1934 Act merely emphasised ttie modest 
scope of action tiiat govemment wished to pursue. However, one positive 
development did emerge from the 1934 Act, and although an unforeseen 
consequence, has had a long-temi impact: 'Above all... the Commissioner for England 
and Wales succeeded in establishing - within the confines of the Act - the first 
govemment financed trading estates and so took one essential step in attracting new 
industries to ttie Areas' (Loebl, 1987, p58). By the onset of ttie Second Worid War, 
the first of tiiese 'to-ading estates', Team Valley at Gateshead, was 700 acres in size 
and had 2,520 employees on site (McCord, 1979). The estates were established 
by 'non profit making companies' who purchased ttie sites and facilitated 
development with cento-al govemment finance. 
After the war, the Special Areas legislation of 1934, and tiie Amendment Act (1937), 
were replaced with the introduction of the 1945 Distribution of Industoy Act. However 
intended, post war location policy differed little from pre-war diversification policy 
used in the 'Special Areas', which were subsequentiy called 'Development Areas'. 
The main aim of this post-war legislation was to make tiie designated areas less 
vulnerable to general cyclical unemployment and ttie decline of industiy or particular 
groups of industries (Allen, Odber and Bowden, 1957). The 1947 Town and 
Country Planning Act followed the same emphasis as previous legislation and was 
predominantiy concerned with the consti-uction of trading estates and factories. The 
1947 Act introduced IDCs, Industrial Development Certificates, to discourage the 
location of industry in more prosperous areas by a refusal to issue a Certificate for 
development. '14 years had passed since the Investigator for Durham and Tyneside 
had first proposed a location of industry policy as a means of dealing with 
unemployment in the Areas. When the 1947 Act came into force - and for many 
years aftenwards - the North East enjoyed full employment' (Loebl, 1987, p225). 
However, location policy pursued by various governments made only a very small 
contribution to this situation. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, ttie era of Keynesian demand management and tiie 
'welfare consensus', Tyneside experienced low levels of unemployment; in 1955 
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unemployment was under 2.0% although the national figure was even lower at under 
1 %. A strong demand for coal and steel, and the fact tiiat some 34% of ttie Nortti 
East's insured work force were still attached to the older basic industties of the region 
and benefiting from the boom, gave good reason for optimism. However, the 
buoyant state of the economy at tills time concealed significant economic problems. 
There was an overall decrease in the demand for shipbuilding and coal mining began 
to decline both relatively and absolutely as oil became freely and cheaply available 
on ttie mari<et. At ttie beginning of ttie 1960s ttie economic climate worsened in the 
Nortti East and again unemployment began to rise. 
From the eariy 1960s, there were large scale job losses especially in coal mining and 
shipbuilding. Between 1961 and 1971 the coal mining industry lost almost 60,000 
jobs in the North East, (Hudson, in Chapman, 1985) whilst shipbuilding employment 
conb-acted by 34.9% or 16,000 jobs. Other manufacturing industries suffered 
relatively less, with an overall contraction of 4.4% (Robinson, Wren and Goddanj, 
1987). Whilst the existing'heavy industry continued to confract, the service sector 
and parts of the public sector witnessed expansion. Relatively high spending in 
education and health in tiie 1960s and 1970s meant that job losses in heavy industry 
were at least numerically offset. Total employment between 1961 and 1971 in Tyne 
and Wear fell by only 3.3% (Robinson, Wren and Goddard, 1987), however, tills 
masked a more significant change. Males were losing ttieir jobs in the heavy 
engineering industries, while women were tending to gain the new jobs in ttie service 
sector. The majority of jobs were lost in mining and shipbuilding; jobs created were 
concentrated in public services such as healtti and education, and many were part-
time as opposed to full time in nature. 
Trends that emerged in the eariy 1960s became more prominent by tiie late 1970s. 
Further changes in employment meant tiiat only 31.1 % of tiie jobs in the Northern 
region were in the manufacturing industry by 1978 and only 4.5% in mining. The 
most evident to^end though was the increase in female employment: by 1978,41.1% 
of all employed people in Tyne and Wear were female (Robinson, Wren and 
Goddard, 1987). Although the service sector had expanded greatly, this had not 
compensated for the types of jobs lost in the heavy manufacturing indusfries. Even 
with the expansion of the service and public sectors, unemployment during the 
1970s increased rapidly. By 1973 the unemployment rate in Tyne and Wear was 
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4.9%, by June 1979 it had neariy doubled to 9.6% (Robinson, Wren and Goddard, 
1987) while the figure for the UK was 5.3% at tills time. 
Employment and the Economy In the North East - Post 1979 
During tiie 1980s changes in employment patterns were considerable, and especially 
in relation to the 'North/South Divide'. Between 1979 and 1986, total employment in 
Great Britain fell by 745,000. However, employment grew by 345,000 in the South 
alongside a 1,100,000 decline in tiie North (Martin and Townroe, 1988). This feature 
was not exclusive to the recessionary phase of the eariy 1980s; during the 
recovery/boom between 1983 and 1987, ttie South increased employment by 8.7% 
in service sector employment (Massey and Allen, 1988) whilst the North gained only 
1.9% in this dynamic sector, further widening and deepening ttie gap between ttie 
Nortii and Soutii (Maclnnes, 1988). Altiiough employment increased by 4% fi'om 
1983 to 1987 in the Nortii, it was not until 1987 that unemployment began to fall in tiie 
region, from 16.4% in 1986 to 14.9% in 1987. 
National, Regional and Local Claimant Unemployment - February 1994 
Total Rate % 
Tyne and Wear 70,507 13.1 
Norttiem 169,600 12.2 
United Kingdom 2,841,413 10.1 
(TWRIU 1994) 
The eariy 1980s witnessed a major upheaval for the economy of the region 
especially for the traditional heavy industries; iron and steel was the leading source 
of job losses in the area in 1980 and 1981 (Townsend, 1983). During 1980 and 1981 
tiiere were more than 66,000 redundancies in tiie region, concentrated mainly in the 
manufacturing sector. Whilst traditional industries were particulariy affected by ttie 
recession, branch plant facilities - established with regional support to strengthen 
local economies - proved vulnerable to corporate restmcturing. 'Between 1978 and 
1983 the number of employees in employment in the Norttiem region fell by 185,000, 
a decline of 14.9%' (Robinson, 1992). 
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By the beginning of the second recession in 1989 /1990, manufacturing employment 
had stabilised in Tyne and Wear, although employing significantiy fewer people than 
ten years eariier. Tyne and Wear has suffered less ttian other areas in the recent 
economic downturn, but had benefited less from the expansion of the economy in the 
mid 1980s. However, the cun-ent recession is widening and deepening and reduction 
in demand from both home and foreign markets is generating genuine fears about ttie 
future. 
The area has, over ttie past ten years, undergone significant change. Although 
decline has often been characteristic of the North East, investments by Nissan, ttie 
development of tiie Metro Cenfre and the expansion in tiie offshore sector on the 
Tyne has given Tyne and Wear a more diverse economic base. 
Employees In Employment - Tyne and Wear 1981 -1993 (OOO's) 
Year Primary Manufacturing Construction Services Total 
1981 24.7 126.0 25.2 275.8 451.7 
1984 20.1 100.8 24.1 275.4 420.4 
1987 14.2 91.8 24.3 299.8 425.7 
1991 10.2 87.9 24.9 306.8 429.9 
1993 8.0 84.1 20.4 305.4 418.1 
(Census of Employment 1981 - 1991; 
TWRIU 1993) 
Total employment in Tyne and Wear by 1991, at 430,000, was still below the 1981 
level of 452,000. The most significant reduction in terms of employment over the past 
twenty years in Tyne and Wear has been in the primary sector; in 1971 7 .1% 
(36,000) of total employees in the Tyne and Wear area were employed in this sector, 
by 1990 this had reduced to 11,000 or 2.5%. By 1993 this figure had further reduced 
to 1.9% or 8,000 employees. 
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(Census of Employment 1981 - 1991; 
TWRIU 1993) 
Manufacturing has also been severely hit, with 95,000 jobs disappearing between 
1971 and 1990, a drop from 37% to 21 .1% of all employees in Tyne and Wear. The 
manufacturing industry has stabilised over the past five years whereas the service 
sector has continued to expand and by mid 1993 represented 73 .1% of all 
employees in Tyne and Wear (TWRIU, 1993). 
By June 1990 the total number of employees in employment in Tyne and Wear was 
estimated to be 442,900, an increase of 13,300 since mid 1989. The rate of increase, 
at 3 . 1 % was greater than job growth in Britain (+2.2%) over the period and above 
that of the Northern region (+2.5%). However, neariy half of the Tyne and Wear 
employment growth was in part time work (an increase of 6,400); indeed part time 
employment grew by 5.6%, much faster than that of full time employment at 2.2%. 
By mid 1993, the employment picture was deteriorating. Employee numbers in Tyne 
and Wear had fallen to 418,100 by 1991 and between mid 1992 and mid 1993 
numbers fell by some 12,000. The service sector increased its employment share to 
over 73%, but in every division had a fall in real numbers in employment - a reverse 
on the previous year. 
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Main employment growth sectors In Tyne and Wear -1991 
Education, health and other services +4,200 
Finance and business services +3,200 
Public Administration +2,900 
Engineering +1,600 
Wholesale,distribution, hotel and catering +1,500 
(TWRIU, 1993) 
Full time jobs accounted for: three quarters of net growth in engineering and finance 
and business services, less than two thirds of job gains in public administration and 
only one quarter in wholesale, distribution, hotels and catering. Tyne and Wear's 
industrial structure is now heavily dominated by the sen/ice sector and, at 73 .1% of 
total employment more so than the North and Great Britain. Just 20 .1% of all 
employees in Tyne and Wear worked in the manufacturing sector in mid 1993,1.9% 
in primary and 4.9% in construction. The Service Sector (even in a period of overall 
employee decline) is increasing its share of employment in Tyne and Wear, a trend 
that is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. 
Unemployment has for long been a considerable problem in the North East. The 
average unemployment rate for Tyne and Wear between 1979 and 1991 was 
14.9%, significantly higher than the national figure for the same period - 9 .1% 
(TWRIU, 1993). Although the unemployment figure at April 1992 (12.6%) was lower 
than the 1979 - 1991 average, the rate is still rising and is the fourth highest 
unemployment rate (county level) in the country; a third higher again than the rate for 
Great Britain as a whole at 10.4%. Unemployment rates for Tyne and Wear have 
been consistently higher than the rest of the country. In the case of social indicators, 
the case is much the same. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the North, and particulariy Tyne and Wear, appear 
marginalised and disadvantaged in both economic and social terms in relation to the 
rest of the country: 
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(Regional Trends 25 (1990); 26 (1991)) 
Two main points are cleariy evident from these tables. Firstly, Tyne and Wear falls 
behind both the North and UK on both indices and secondly that, for GDP and 
household income, the North's relative performance fell throughout much of the 1980s 
and by 1991, had not regained its 1981 level. It is clear that the North / South divide 
in economic tenns is paralleled by a similar divide in social temis. Although house 
prices are lower in the North and public services are less stretched, the North still 
compares unfavourably to the South (Robinson, 1992). Weekly income is 19% 
below the national average, a gap that has widened throughout the 1980s. Fewer 
people continue education after the age of 16 in the North, and the region's 
Standardised Mortality Ratio, at 111, (UK =100) is the third highest in the UK 
(Regional Trends 25, 1990). 
The persistence of pockets of high unemployment and poverty in uriDan areas has 
now become a familiar economic and social problem. It has become clear that higher 
than average levels of unemployment, poverty, crime and deprivation are 
concentrated in certain areas and on particular estates, and that these problems have 
become a persistent feature of life in these inner areas. 
Many of the problems evident today within these inner areas can be traced back to 
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the long term demise of the three traditional industries of the Tyneside area. Both 
central and local government have introduced a variety of public policy measures -
regional, urban, industrial and labour market - aimed at directly targeting areas with the 
most severe problems. That said, the most common feature of this public policy 
response in the area has been its failure to address the persistently higher than 
average levels of unemployment: 'Policy fads and fashions have come and gone, 
each leaving a layer of policy and a set of institutions. The region consequently has 
a plethora of economic development policies and agencies' (Robinson, 1992, pp91-
92). It is to this complex overiay of policies that the discussion now turns. 
Regional Policy 
The North East of England has had an intimate relationship with Regional Policy since 
the introduction of the Special Areas Act in 1934. Indeed, Regional Policy has until 
recently been the most important policy instrument in tenns of economic development 
in the area. The underiying principle of Regional Policy has been the identification of 
specific geographical areas that require assistance - mainly on the basis of above 
average unemployment rates. This has always included the North East of England. 
In both 1984 and 1988 the DTI reduced the geographical scope of Regional Policy 
and began to target fewer areas. The Regional Development Grant (RDG) - an 
automatic grant on neariy all new manufacturing investment - was withdrawn and 
replaced, in 1988, by the Regional Enterprise Grant, a scheme that provided 
discretionary rather than automatic grants and on a much smaller scale than the RDG. 
The whole of Tyneside continues to have Special Development Area status, and is 
thus eligible for the maximum level of regional policy assistance. 
Today, the major form of assistance for all Assisted Areas is Regional Selective 
Assistance (RSA). RSA is available to companies and projects which can 'create' or 
'safeguard' jobs, and acts as a discretionary grant toward capital and training costs. 
Spending on RSA in England (estimated) for 1993 -1994 is £100m, and by far 
outweighs designated expenditure under the other two regional grant regimes. 
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Whilst direct financial assistance to firms has steadily declined over the past 15 years 
(a trend that is set to continue in the foreseeable future) other more targeted policy 
measures have been implemented; 'While Regional Policy has declined in 
importance, both financially and politically, urban and local policy has become much 
more prominent' (Robinson, Wren and Goddard, 1987, p92). 
Urban Policy 
Whilst Regional Policy covers wide areas - indeed all of Tyne and Wear and much of 
the North East - most other policies operating on Tyneside are far more spatially 
focused and operate within quite tight geographical boundaries. These policies are 
operated in the main by the Department of the Environment; 
Urban Development Corporations; in terms of financial commitment Tyne and 
Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) is the most significant central govemment 
urtjan policy operating in the Tyneside area. UDCs aim to regenerate their areas by 
bringing buildings and land into effective use. TWDC operates along significant 
riverside stretches of the Tyne and the Wear. Thirteen UDCs operate in England and 
Wales. TWDC's budget for 1994 /1995 is £43.1 m. 
City Challenge; this is one of the most recent urban policy initiatives and in political 
tenns (though not in financial terms) cun-ently the most favoured. City Challenge 
targets specific residential areas and also specific groups within those areas. Action 
is based upon a 'multi agency' partnership approach. Newcastle upon Tyne was 
successful in the first round of bidding, followed a year later by North Tyneside. Both 
receive £37.5m over a five year period, ending in March 1997 (Newcastle) and March 
33 
1998 (North Tyneside). 
The Urban Programme and Single Regeneration Budget; The Urban 
Programme aimed to create healthy economies, encourage enterprise and new 
business and improve peoples job prospects and covered the inner areas of 
Tyneside. The UP has now been abolished and, in a sense, subsumed within the 
uncommitted money available through the SRB. In the first round of bidding in 1994, 
Tyne and Wear received over £8.7m SRB funding split between 12 individual 
projects. The smallest total grant (£0.3m) went to Walker Open Learning and Fitness 
Centre, whilst the largest grant was made to Meadow Well Regeneration - £15m. 
Tyne and Wear received 57% of total resources committed to the Nortti East, 
although the North East received only 10% of total resources on offer nationally. 
National spending 1995/1996 - £102.9m. Committed spending after first allocation -
£761.15m 
Enterprise Zone; although the Tyneside Enterprise Zone ceased to exist from 
1991, and had achieved a substantial impact in the development of the largest retail 
development in the area - the Metro Centre - and providing financial assistance (in 
rates and tax benefits) to the Newcastle Business Park developed by TWDC. The 
Enterprise Zone covered an area of 1,100 acres of land to the west of Newcastle and 
Gateshead. More recently, an Enterprise Zone application has been submitted to the 
Govemment Office for the North East for North Tyneside, centred around the former 
Swan Hunter's shipyard; the process of designation is expected to take around 
eighteen months. There already exists an Enterprise Zone on the banks of the Wear 
in Sunderiand. 
English Partnerships; launched on 10th November 1993, English Partnerships 
promotes the regeneration and development of vacant, derelict and contaminated land 
and buildings throughout England. English Partnerships operates on Tyneside 
through management of the existing English Estates portfolio and City Grant 
schemes it has now taken over. The annual national budget of English Partnerships 
was in excess of £250m in 1993 /1994. 
In addition. Derelict Land Grant is available for public bodies and private fimns to 
cover 50% -100% of the net cost for reclaiming derelict land and City Grant is 
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allocated to private sector development projects that would not otherwise be 
developed. 
Urban Policy concentrates resources specifically on the inner city but this targeting 
ranges from the widespread availability of the UriDan Programme (replaced by the 
Single Regeneration Budget which all areas can bid for) to the relatively small areas 
covered by City Challenge and Enterprise Zones. Many of the general grant regimes 
- Urban Programme, City Grant, Derelict Land Grant - are available within areas 
covered by other urtDan policy initiatives - such as City Challenge and UDCs - and 
correspondingly, the impacts are often difficult to disentangle. 
Conclusion 
Even though contemporary urban policy has been in existence for over twenty five 
years cities, and their problems, remain high on the political agenda. Britain has long 
suffered from the effects of economic decline - decline which has impacted especially 
on cities, and particulariy on the inner areas of cities. Despite a variety of public 
policy initiatives over past decades, urban problems have continued to worsen. 
There are now many inner areas of cities where people are excluded from the 
conventional labour market, where crime rates continue to increase and where the 
poor and disadvantaged groups of society are becoming increasingly concentrated. 
Whilst governments will continue to develop new, even innovative urban policies, 
past experience suggests they will only have a marginal impact on the very serious 
economic and social problems evident in many inner areas.Their impact is small 
relative to the impact of macro economic events and mainstream policies. 
Today, two dominant urtaan policies can be identified on Tyneside. First, Urban 
Development Corporations which were the government's favoured mechanism for 
achieving urban regeneration throughout the 1980s. Although their approach has 
been questioned, they still enjoy a substantial level of funding. The other major urban 
policy. City Challenge, appears to be the politically favoured urban policy of the 
1990s, though commands significantly less resources than its UDC counterpart. Both 
initiatives have had significant impacts on their areas, but have approached their 
regenerative tasks in very different ways. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS AND CITY 
CHALLENGE - PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
Introduction 
The election of the Conservative govemment in 1979 saw the Urban Programme 
reorientated toward economic development projects, and other initiatives introduced, 
such as Enterprise Zones, gave prominence to physical and economic development 
rather than social policy. At the beginning of the 1980s Michael Heseltine (then 
Secretary of State - DoE) introduced Urban Development Corporations; throughout 
the 1980s UDCs have been the government's favoured mechanism for achieving 
urban regeneration and have been refen-ed to as 'the most important attack ever 
made on urtaan decay' (Action for Cities, 1988). Some ten years later Michael 
Heseltine (returning to the DoE for a second time as Secretary of State) introduced 
City Challenge. The City Challenge programme appeared to be an active move 
away from previous urban policy initiatives which focused upon the physical 
development of derelict land. Instead local authorities, the voluntary sector and local 
communities were given a chance to become 'partners' in the regeneration of their 
areas. In 1995, both policies are operating on Tyneside and although created some 
ten years apart, appear to be pursuing similar themes. 
The following Chapter seeks to explore the progress and achievements of Tyne and 
Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) and North Tyneside City Challenge 
(NTCC). The first parts of sections one and two examine the legislative backgrounds 
of UDCs and City Challenge and discusses their powers and responsibilities. The 
final parts examine the job creation records of the two organisations. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn which compares the progress and success of each organisation 
in meeting its objectives. 
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1. Urban Development Corporations 
UrtDan Development Corporations (UDCs) were first designated in the London 
Docklands and on Merseyside in 1981. This was followed, in May 1987, by the 
establishment of five second generation UDCs in Trafford Park Manchester, Tyne 
and Wear, Teesside, the Black Country and Cardiff Bay. In 1989, four 'mini UDCs' 
were created in Central Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol. More recently two 
more UDCs have been created, one based on the local authority led initiative 
'Birmingham Heartlands' and one in Plymouth. 
UDCs are powerful quangos committed to an approach based heavily upon land 
and property development. Throughout much of the 1980s the UK property market 
boomed, and this added to the government's belief that UDCs were the most 
appropriate and effective agencies for the task of uriDan regeneration. 
UDCs operate a very particular type of urtDan regeneration that can be clearty 
distinguished: 'UrtDan regeneration has become a shorthand for the revitalisation of 
UrtDan areas through the attraction of private sector investment. The method is to 
'lever in' property development capital by reclaiming land, putting in transport 
improvements, and by high profile marketing campaigns. The aim is to transform 
relatively small but prominent parts of urban areas, to make them attractive to 
developers, thus setting off a chain of inward investment...UDCs typify this 
approach....' (CLES, 1992, p7). 
By the end of the 1980s questions concerning the effectiveness of the UDC 
approach to urioan regeneration were being raised by a variety of different interests. 
The London Docklands, which commanded the lion's share of UDC expenditure 
through the 1980s, attracted some of the most trenchant criticisms aimed at any UDC 
in the country. The London Boroughs 'affected' by LDDC's UrtDan Development Area 
(UDA) - Newham, Southwari< and Tower Hamlets - campaigned vigorously against 
the undemocratic nature of the LDDC and voiced severe concerns about the 
imbalance of the scheme and the lack of any coherent plan for the Docklands area 
Pertiaps more importantly two Pariiamentary Committees, the Employment 
Committee (1988) and the Committee of Public Accounts (1989), as well as the 
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National Audit Office (1988) expressed serious concerns over UDC relationships 
with local authorities, their financial arrangements and noted that any benefit created 
by development appeared to be bypassing local people. Whilst the govemment 
largely ignored many of the recommendations and findings of these committees, most 
second and third generation UDCs seemed to take on board many of the 
Committees' criticisms of the UDC model and actively distanced themselves from the 
precedent established by LDDC. 
At the end of the 1980s UDCs were operating in a different political context from 
which they were established. John Major had succeeded Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister, bringing with him notions of the 'Classless Society' and Citizens Charter. In 
1991, Michael Heseltine launched the City Challenge scheme, a policy that actively 
moved away from the UDC concept of regeneration by working with local authorities, 
voluntary and public agencies and by integrating the social and physical aspects of 
development (CLES, 1992). 
That said, UDCs still remain as major players in the field of urtsan regeneration; the 13 
UDCs in existence in 1993 /1994 were allocated a budget of £372.1 m by the DoE. 
City Challenge authorities receive £7.5m per year over a five year period, an overall 
City Challenge budget of £232.5m per year shared by 31 authorities. UDCs, if not 
the favoured mechanism to achieve urban regeneration in the 1990s, still enjoy a 
significant commitment and influence in their respective areas. 
Powers and Organisation 
UDCs were established under Part XVI of the 'Local Govemment Planning and Land 
Act' (1980). Under the provisions of the Act the Secretary of State for the 
Environment may designate Uriaan Development Areas (UDAs) and establish UDCs 
with responsibility for regenerating these areas. UDCs are given wide powers: 'for 
bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of 
existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment and 
ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people to live 
and work in the area' (S.I36, Local Government Planning and Land Act, 1980). 
The 1980 Act grants UDCs significant powers to regenerate their areas, and 
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additionally gives the UDC a considerable amount of discretion in how to pursue this 
objective. UDCs have the power to take over land held by public bodies -'Vesting' -
and can acquire land from private bodies through Compulsory Purchase Orders. 
Aside from having total planning power in the designated area UDCs can 'do 
anything necessary or expedient for the purposes of the object [regeneration] or for 
purposes incidental to those purposes'. 
UDCs are, however, required (or obliged) to consult with local authorities on planning 
applications and also take note of their Development Plans. That said, the Act does 
not define or prescribe a model for this relationship. UDCs take a considerable 
amount of power away from local authorities. 
In terms of accountability, UDCs are responsible to the Secretary of State for the 
DoE and in turn the Secretary is responsible to Parliament; UDCs are not 
democratically accountable at the local level. 
The UDC structure consists of a Board, whose members are appointed by the 
Secretary of State, and a team of Executive Officers. Representation on the Board is 
often dominated by the private sector, and although a number of local Councillors are 
members they are required to participate as individuals and not as Council members. 
Very few Board members live within, or adjacent to, their UrtDan Development Areas. 
Minutes of the Board meetings are not available to the public, or indeed local 
authorities, and many crucial decisions are made at this level. UDCs are, though, 
required to produce Annual Reports which have to include financial statements, future 
plans and a review of progress made during the year. UDCs are subject to 
assessment by performance indicators developed by the DoE and these are 
published in tiie DoE's Annual Expenditure Plans. Otherwise, UDCs remain 
secretive about much of their day to day activity. 
UDCs are non - elected, locally unaccountable single purpose agencies charged with 
regenerating, in predominantly physical temis, a specified area. UDCs command 
substantial resources for regenerating derelict areas and have a significant degree of 
autonomy (from the DoE regionally and nationally) to achieve this objective. 
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Although UDCs were established by a piece of legislation that defined their remit in 
predominantly physical tenns, toward the end of the 1980s most UDCs began to 
recognise the need to incorporate social and community dimensions into their work. 
However, defining regeneration in broader terms than those expressed in the 1980 
Act has proved difficult - and not all UDCs have successfully achieved this end. 
Regeneration - A Changing Concept? 
The first two UDCs, established in London Docklands and on Merseyside in 1981, 
began their operational lives by sticking closely to the concept of regeneration (or 
general strategy) outlined in the 1980 Act. Whilst both UDCs pursued similar 
approaches - based around land acquisition and property development - the 
success they enjoyed differed significantly. 
Merseyside Development Corporation's (MDC) activities demonstrated the 
inadequacies of property led regeneration operating in a declining industrial area of 
North West England. Apart from one major development, the Albert Edward Dock, 
little else has been developed in the MDC area. 
London Docklands, on other hand, has been extremely successful in acquiring land 
and facilitating physical development, due in part to substantial resources being at its 
disposal and its close proximity to the City of London's financial centre. 
Nevertheless, London Docklands emphasises the inadequacies of an approach that 
did little else than promote mari<et led physical development. Only minor 
consideration was given to the planning of transport infrastructure, provision of social 
housing and, most importantly, benefit for local communities. In reviewing the two 
UDCs, the House of Commons' Employment Committee (1988, para 89) went as far 
to state that: 'UDCs cannot be regarded as a success if buildings and land are 
regenerated but the local communities are bypassed and do not benefit from 
regeneration'. The Committee went onto to say that: '..the remit of UDCs should be 
altered to provide a more precise definition of 'regeneration'. This should include 
employment and unemployment objectives, both in general and for the local 
community. It should also charge the UDCs with greater responsibility for ensuring 
the communities both in the area covered by UDCs and in the neighbouring areas 
benefit from regeneration'. Nevertheless, the Govemment maintained its original line -
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in short - that local communities would benefit from the infamous 'trickle down effect'. 
Despite the government's refusal to define regeneration in broader tenns, most 
second and third generation UDCs have actively developed community and social 
dimensions to their work. However, this has to be balanced against the fact that the 
concept of regeneration remains unaltered from the 1980 Act and output measures 
developed by the DoE still measure success in predominantly physical terms. 
In the 1990s UDCs appear to be faced with competing imperatives; the community 
has been reintroduced into uriDan regeneration and the govemment, on the level of 
rhetoric at least, has become sensitive to its needs. However, UDCs are given little 
guidance from the DoE on how to secure benefit for local people and incorporate them 
into the development process. 
UDCs face a dilemma on who should actually benefit from their efforts. Benefit from 
UDC action was intended to 'trickle down' into the local economy, however, mounting 
criticisms of this approach has made many UDCs reconsider their position; UDC 
developments now have to benefit local people more directly. But, how has this 
transferred into practice and have people benefited from UDC action on Tyneside? 
Tyne and Wear Development Corporation 
Progress and Achievements 
Tyne and Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) was fonnally established in May 
1987. An initial strategy document produced by Price Watertiouse in April 1987 (and 
commissioned by the DoE) has shaped much of TWDC's action over the past 
seven years. The original consultant's report put fonwanj a series of 
recommendations on what might be developed, estimated overall costs and general 
strategies that might be adopted to achieve these recommended aims. 
TWDC's UriDan Development Area (UDA) was drawn closely around areas that had 
potential for development - mainly derelict riverside and industrial sites - whilst 
excluding areas with high residential concentrations. Subsequently, the resident 
population within TWDC's UDA was low, at just over 3,700 (NAO, 1993). The UDA 
is divided into two distinct parts, along the river Tyne and the river Wear, covering an 
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overall area of 6,000 acres of mainly riverside land that stretches over 27 miles. 
Although the UDA has two geographically distinct areas, the Corporation maintain 
that they have been subjected to similar economic processes in the past and can be 
approached by a common method. 
The Price Watertiouse report concentrated heavily upon the physical aspects of 
regeneration; this is not surprising as both the DoE and the 1980 Act placed 
significant emphasis on physical development. The Report recommended that 
development of the UDA should address problems caused by deindustrialisation and 
the movement of people away from the riverside strips - a process that has 
continued for many years. Whilst Price Watertiouse acknowledged that some of the 
potential development sites would require major investment before they would 
become viable development areas, they subsequently underestimated the eventual 
amounts TWDC would have to invest. 
Unlike grandiose strategies adopted in other UDC areas, most notably the London 
Docklands, TWDC's strategy was modest, encompassing a mix of different types of 
development. Light industrial, housing, office, retail and leisure were all identified as 
potential forms of development and were placed within a wider framewori< of land use 
identified by the consultants. Within this overall framework four 'key sites' were 
identified, subsequently to be temied 'flagship projects"; these key sites have 
become central to TWDC's regeneration strategy. 
Land acquisition and assembly were the initial tasks facing the Corporation; investors 
required sites that were under single ownership and TWDC regarded this as 
essential. The Corporation reviewed the original consultant's report by 
commissioning Area Studies which identified strategies for particular areas and 
provided detailed information on local site potential. The overall mix of development 
now supported by TWDC emerged from suggestions in the consultant's report, the 
four Area Studies but also from local authority projects that had already been 
proposed before TWDC's establishment, but fell wittiin the boundaries of the UDA. 
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Development Projects 
The first major project undertaken by the Corporation, and the only one completed to 
date, is the Newcastle Business Park flagship project to the west of Newcastle City 
Centre. The site, originally the location for Vickers Armstrong annaments wori<s, was 
purchased from the City Council by TWDC in 1988. The Council had begun 
reclamation on the site and had outline proposals for a retail, leisure, industrial and 
business park to be called the Armstrong Centre. However, a lack of interest, 
particulariy in the retail part, saw little happen apart from minor land reclamation. In 
1988 TWDC interested Dysart developers (the original developers with the Council) 
in developing a business pari<, and then began major land reclamation to free the site 
for development. The demand for a business park close to the City Centre offering 
purpose built offices, car parking and easy access proved strong. Major companies 
such as British Ainvays, AA Insurance and even TWDC itself relocated operations to 
the site and the scheme has proved very successful. TWDC contributed at least 
£12.5m to the development (site reclamation and operation) and additional subsidy 
was gained through the Tyneside Enterprise Zone, which offered tax allowances and 
a rates holiday between 1981 and 1991. 
Approximately five miles east from the Newcastle Business Park is 'Walker Riverside 
Industrial Technology Park', a joint venture between TWDC and the City Council. 
TWDC became partners when the Council found it difficult (in tenns of resources) to 
continue reclamation of the fonner Walker shipyard site; this venture cleariy reflects 
the pragmatic relationship that exists between TWDC and Newcastle upon Tyne 
City Council. 
In the Newcastle area TWDC has also been involved in a series of smaller scale 
projects. TWDC have promoted the development of a new watertront hotel, the 
Copthome. Adjacent to this site the Corporation has facilitated an office development, 
which is now largely complete. Further down the river in Byker, TWDC have 
invested £9m in a 'Marina Village' called St. Peter's Basin. The project includes 
executive housing, a marina, a small number of shops and a 'Chandlery'. The site is, 
though, over shadowed by a scrap yard and a reclamation plant operated by 
Newcastle City Council. TWDC provided one third of the total cost of £27m on this 
project. 
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The most significant development site in the Newcastie area is the 25 acre East 
Quayside flagship project. Whilst the Corporation has described it as the 'jewel in 
the crown on the Newcastle riverside' it has nevertheless been beset by many 
problems. The original developer, Stanley Miller, went into liquidation eariy in tiie 
project and its then partiier, Rosehaugh, encountered severe financial difficulties, and 
was forced to withdraw from the project and eventually went into receivership itself. 
TWDC also experienced serious problems in its attempts to acquire land on the site. 
Two owners of small parts of the site. Lesser Landau, Swiss architect and 
businessman, and Procter and Gamble contested the Corporation's Compulsory 
Purchase Order served upon them. However, the House of Lonjs Judicial Committee 
upheld TWDC's CPO in 1992, settling a three year legal wrangle. Work has now 
begun on site though the new developers, AMEC, are only constructing buildings 
where end users have been identified and are proceeding cautiously. Overall TWDC 
expenditure is expected to be £64m of a total project cost of £183m. 
In the eariy stages of TWDC's life, both activity and expenditure focused on 
Newcastle, but more recentiy sites and projects in other areas have begun to 
emerge. Two flagship sites now exist in Sunderiand; Sunderiand Enterprise Park is a 
significant reclamation project based on the old Hylton Colliery site and aims to attract 
industry and commerce to the area. Although the site benefits from EZ status, littie 
employment or business has located to tiie Park. St. Peter's Riverside is a large 
scale housing, business and marina complex based around the fornier North Sands 
shipyard and Manor Quay. The University of Sunderiand is building a second 
campus on the site, and the project is supported by a £35m grant from the 
Corporation. 
The major development site in North Tyneside is the Royal Quays flagship scheme. 
The original developers, AVATAR, were released by the Corporation and now 
TWDC themselves are acting as lead developer. Over 130 social housing units 
have been constructed by North Housing and three private house builders, Cussins, 
Belway and Leech, have recentiy begun development on site. Twinings Tea factory 
relocated from a nearby ti-ading estate and represents the only indusfrial 
development on site. Wet 'n' Wild Waterpark - the sole leisure facility on site - has 
enjoyed significant success since opening in July 1993; over 330,000 used the 
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facility in its first year of operation. To date no retail or office provision has been 
developed although there are plans for factory shopping and a leisure facility in the 
near future. A 'Linear Park' has been completed in the middle of the site and follows 
on from Smiths Park (a City Challenge project). Adjacent to the Royal Quays is 
Meadow Well estate, scene of rioting in 1991 and one of the most socially and 
economically deprived areas in the North East. It remains to be seen how Royal 
Quays integrates with the surrounding area. Royal Quays is TWDC's single biggest 
development site and will command significant investment over the next five years. 
In addition to the flagship and other major developments already outlined, TWDC 
have developed a number of smaller projects aimed at creating a 'necklace of 
development' along the Tyne. These include, in South Tyneside, Littlehaven (South 
Shields) housing and hotel scheme; Simonside and Viking Industrial Parks; Bede 
Heritage Centre in Jarrow and a new arts and entertainment centre at the old 
Customs House in South Shields. In North Tyneside TWDC have invested in 
improvements to the North Shields Fish Quay as well as assisting AMEC Offshore's 
construction yard in Wallsend. In Newcastle TWDC have also developed the 
Central Business and Technology Park on the old Manors site adjacent to Newcastle 
City Centre. But nevertheless, TWDC's main preoccupation has been with the few, 
large scale 'flagship developments' which dominate the Corporation's resource 
allocation. Five flagship projects currently exist and can be summarised as follows; 





Dysart Development Limited 
Business Park 
£173m (with Enterprise Zone status) 
£13.5m 
East Quayside: Newcastle 
Lead Developer AMEC 
Development Type Retail (41,000m2) Hotel, retail, leisure and 
housing (215 high quality housing) 
Project Cost : £183m (estimated) 
TWDC Contribution £64m (estimated) 
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Royal Quays: North Tyneside 
Lead Developer TWDC 
Development Type 1,200 houses - sale and rent, industrial 
floor space (20,000m2), retail park, hotel 
and leisure facilities 
Project Cost £290m (estimated) 
TWDC Contribution £84m 
St. Peter's Riverside: Sunderland 
Lead Developer TWDC 
Development Type Marina, Housing, Business Centre, 
University Campus 
Project Cost £90m 
TWDC Contribution £35m 
Sunderland Enterprise Park: Sunderland 
Lead Developer : English Partnerships (Hylton Park) 





Industrial, office and retail planned 
£58.5m (with EZ benefits) 
£19.5m 
Project costs for the five flagship developments will, if estimates are correct, amount 
to some £795m, of which TWDC have provided £216m (27.1%) (Robinson, 
Lawrence and Shaw, 1993). Price Waterhouse recommended in their report that 
TWDC should concentrate on a number of key sites - flagship projects. Accordingly, 
53% of total resources went into the four flagship projects (excluding Newcastle 
Business Park) in 1991 - 1992. That said, concentration on the flagship sites 
necessarily excludes developments in other areas; Hendon in Sunderland, for 
example, has seen little development. 
Between 1987 and 1995, TWDC was allocated £224m from the DoE (net of receipts) 
of which £150m was spent on land acquisition and reclamation (67% of total budget). 
TWDC has spent £99m on reclaiming 384 hectares of land. In total some 1,923 
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housing units have been completed in the area. The physical impact of TWDC action 
on the Urban Development Area has been significant, and has attracted £561.6m of 
private investments. By the end of its eleven year life span, TWDC aims to achieve 
£1 billion of private sector investment in its area, based on an eventual leverage ratio 
of £2 private funding to £1 TWDC investment (Hansard, Written Answers, 29.6.92 
col 367; TWDC Annual Report 1992). 
In physical terms, TWDC has achieved a considerable amount and its record of both 
land acquisition and land reclamation is impressive. Large stretches of once derelict 
riverside have been reclaimed for use and access to the river is now available again. 
Nevertheless, the physical development of land and buildings bears little relation to 
the needs of the local population - especially when suffering some of the highest 
unemployment rates in the region. Ultimately, the success of TWDC must be 
gauged by its impact on local unemployment and the job opportunities it creates for 
people living in the local area. 
Employment and TWDC 
Many local authorities and local communities consider the creation of employment by 
UDC's as the key output measure by which any success should be measured. Of 
the six key output measures identified by the DoE (NAO, 1993, pi 1) five deal 
specifically with physical and financial progress - only one, job creation, bears any 
relation to potential 'community benefit'. The DoE's witness to the House of 
Commons Employment Committee (1988, para 89) makes their position clear: 'We do 
not see UDCs as being primarily and immediately concemed with employment; they 
are about regeneration and indeed the physical regeneration of the area'. 
Nevertheless, many UDCs now consider the creation of employment to be an 
important part of their regenerative task. Certainly, TWDC concede that job creation 
is one of the most tangible benefits UDCs can offer local communities. 
On the level of rhetoric, TWDC clearly appreciates the need to be seen to be 
addressing the issue of job creation. In 'Piloting Progress' (TWDC, 1989c) the 
Corporation state that they wish to 'Create employment and prosperity by 
supporting the growth of local business and by attracting investment into the area'. 
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In a similar document published in the following year, the Corporation are more 
explicit about their activity: 'the success of regeneration in its fullest sense will be 
judged primarily by the reductions achieved in local unemployment' (TWDC, 1989a, 
p26 and TWDC 1990b, p4). 
Whilst it remains clear that the DoE assesses UDC perfonnance in predominantly 
physical terms - land reclaimed, floor space created etc - in an area that has suffered 
higher than average unemployment rates over a long period of time, the most 
relevant and in many ways the only meaningful indicator of success is job creation. 
Assessing TWDC Job Creation 
In general, employment figures tend to be problematic, and especially in the case of 
Urban Development Corporations. A number of cautionary points need to be 
considered. First, there is the problem of attributing job creation to one policy initiative 
or agency. A company moving to an area may receive financial and other forms of 
assistance from a number of different sources and this may vary from substantial 
financial assistance for relocation to one off contiibutions toward training programmes. 
Many agencies will therefore claim to have assisted in tiie creation of employment. 
Second, confusion often arises over the nature of those jobs created. Employment is 
initially generated during tiie primary phases of development - constnjction jobs, but 
these jobs are only temporary in nature and must not be confused with pennanent 
jobs created at the end of tiie development. Construction jobs are often taken by 
workers who move from site to site across the countiy, a ti-end that reduces potential 
employment for local people. Third, UDCs tend to confuse 'real jobs' with 'expected 
jobs'. All too often agencies concentrate upon tiie employment potential of a 
development once it is complete, rather tiian Uie actual numbers of jobs on the 
ground. In one sense, this is good public relations but it nevertheless confuses even 
more an already complex area. Fourth, UDC job estimates fail to take into account 
the type of jobs created; UDC job numbers do not distinguish between 'new jobs' 
and those relocated from existing premises and sites and littie attention is paid to tiie 
type of job created - skilled, unskilled, full time, part time. Nor do job figures reflect tiie 
impact relocation has on existing centi'es of employment. 
In the five years up until 31st March 1995, TWDC claims to have assisted in the 
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creation of 14,883 jobs, with 2,650 created in the 1994/1995 financial year. TWDC 
also claim to have assisted over 100 companies in the area - including Liebhen-
Cranes, British Mmays and the AA. In the future, more jobs are promised as 
flagship developments begin to produce employment; figures released for 
employment potential include 2,000 jobs for East Quayside, 1,500 at Royal Quays 
and a massive 4,000 jobs at Sunderland Enterprise Park. That said, by the end of 
March 1992, five years into its overall life span, TWDC had created only 1,824 jobs 
in the Sunderland part of the UDA. In response to a written question in the House of 
Commons it emerged that TWDC had only created 319 permanent new jobs at its 
main sites in Sunderland by March 1992. Further to this, the number of employees at 
workplaces in the Sunderland part of the UDA fell from an estimated 14,900 in March 
1988 to 13,000 in March 1992 (TWRIU, 1992), a reduction in employees of 1,900. 
This net position provides an even more disappointing picture than TWDC's gross 
figures. 
Clearly, measuring jobs in an exact manner is extremely difficult and fraught with 
many problems. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties it is necessary to 
assess specific cases in more depth. This will be achieved by analysing in detail 
one specific development site - the Newcastle Business Park - which will 'serve to 
highlight not only the problems of assessing the job creation record of UDCs but also 
indicate the shortcomings inherent in this type of approach to regeneration' 
(Robinson, Shaw and Lawrence, 1994, p327). 
Newcastle Business Park 
Consistently cited as TWDC's greatest achievement so far, the Newcastle Business 
Park represents the only completed development in the UDA and is the major source 
of employment aeation for TWDC. According to TWDC's 1991/1992 Annual Report, 
4,000 job opportunities have been created at the Business Park. However, closer 
examination of this claim illustrates that 4,000 job opportunities are expected to be 
aeated at the Business Park. By March 1993, the Corporation claimed that 3,738 
jobs had been created at the Business Park, representing a third of the overall 
TWDC total. TWDC claimed in June 1992, that 3,143 jobs existed on the Park, but a 
telephone survey conducted in August 1992 (Robinson, Lawrence and Shaw, 1993, 
20-1) contradicts this claim. 
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To gain accurate information concerning 'jobs on the ground' at the Pari<, a telephone 
poll was conducted of all seventeen companies operating on the site, asking them 
how many persons they employed at the moment and where ttiey had moved from. 
The seventeen companies at the Business Park employed a total of 2,447 people; 
AA Insurance (1,200) and British Airways (245) accounted for 1,425 or 58% of the 
total jobs on site. British Airways aim was eventijally to locate 1,000 jobs at the Park 
whilst AA Insurance aim to employ 1,300, of which 1,200 are already located at ttie 
Park. But, how many of these 2,447 jobs at the Newcastie Business Pari< are 
actually new jobs? 
Of the seventeen companies on the Business Park at August 1992,11 had relocated 
from Tyne and Wear or other parts of tiie North East. MARI Computer Training had 
relocated from Grainger Pari< Road in Newcastie while Lombard Nortii Centi-al Pic had 
relocated from Gosforth and Sunderiand. AA Insurance, tiie biggest employer on the 
Business Park was a local relocation. The company moved from offices opposite the 
City Library and Central Station (both still vacant) in Newcastle, relocating 1,100 
existing staff and in the process creating just 100 new jobs. That said, tiie AA may 
have moved away from the area if suitable premises were not available; in tills 
sense, TWDC have enabled these jobs to remain in tiie area. 
Of the 4,000 job opportunities expected to be created at tiie Newcastle Business 
Park, (TWDC, 1992) only 2,447 actually existed at the 11tii August 1992. Eleven of 
tiie seventeen companies on ttie Park at this time had relocated from somewhere else 
in the North East - accounting for 759 of ttie total employment. If the jobs at tfie AA 
are added, a further 1,100, then tiie total number of relocations amount to 1,859. 
Of the 2,447 jobs actually on site, only 694 jobs were 'new'. These were created by 
Ministiy of Agriculture Forestry and Food, who moved from Reading bringing 300 
jobs; British Ainways - 225; tiie AA -100; General Accident relocating from Perth with 
40 jobs; Cellnet -11 and Ideda 18. To tiiese 694 jobs, the 1,100 jobs safeguarded 
at AA Insurance might be added. Local relocation can not only safeguard jobs but 
can also strengthen tiie business and in turn the local economy. That said, only 894 
jobs are truly new jobs. 
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Summary 
After examining the job creation record of Tyne and Wear Development Corporation 
in detail, their impact on local unemployment appears limited. There still remains 
confusion on who created what and in terms of 'cost per job' figures the overall 
expense appears high (see Imrie and Thomas, 1993). The development of the 
Newcastle Business Park in providing alternative office space has had a significant 
impact on existing centres. The relocation of AA Insurance has left empty office 
space in Newcastle - now largely unwanted and vacant. This shifting of jobs in and 
around a conurbation may well safeguard jobs (as in the case of the AA), but has 
nevertheless marginalised some areas and clearly favoured others. 
TWDC's claim to have created 14,883 jobs overall (March 1995), but evidence from 
the Newcastle Business Park case study suggests this is likely to be an 
overestimate; only 28% of those jobs created are 'new'. Moreover, set against 
expenditure of £225 million, TWDC's job aeation record becomes even more 
disappointing. In TWDC's defence, much of their expenditure up until March 1995 
has been spent on land acquisition, land development and site reclamation. Some 
flagship projects have yet to yield any significant employment numbers and this may 
change the overall picture somewhat. Nevertheless, 'Govemment will conclude that 
the UDC policy tumed out to be an expensive experiment, with a high cost per job 
figure and poorly targeted benefits' (Robinson, Shaw and Lawrence, 1994, p336). 
UDCs have created a certain number of jobs and riverside land has been made 
accessible and usable again. However, the UDC experiment has been both 
expensive and on Tyneside in particular, has largely failed to address unemployment 
in inner city areas. With only three years left of its operational life, and the DoE 
reducing Grant in Aid to UDCs annually, the ability of TWDC to create the numbers 
of truly new jobs it claimed when it was established was clearly overestimated . The 
Corporation has had a significant physical impact, but little impact upon the position 
and prospects of the disadvantaged communities living in 'the inner city'. 
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2. City Challenge 
City Challenge stands out as one of the most significant developments in central 
government uriaan policy since the 1977 White Paper Policy for ttie Inner Cities. 
Urban initiatives operating ttiroughout tiie 1980s led to a reduction in the role and 
scope of local authority and local community action; a preoccupation with tiie more 
physical aspects of regeneration; and heavy concentration on ttie contribution ttie 
private sector can make - all set within a context of nationally defined and imposed 
policies. City Challenge on the ottier hand represents a move away from these 
tiiemes on ttiree main fronts: 
- it brings back local auttiorities into tiie sphere of urban regeneration after a decade 
of exclusion; 
- the opportijnity to tackle uxban decay in a more holistic way, combining the 
physical, economic and social aspects of regeneration; 
- tiie 'community' has been given an important role as partiier in tiie planning and 
implementation of City Challenge. 
Whilst City Challenge does embody certain traits of previous urban initiatives -
working in parbiership with tiie private sector, being directed by nationally defined 
objectives and guidelines - it does offer scope at tiie local level for local communities 
and local authorities to define programmes applicable to, and developed witiiin, 
specific locales. This, in many ways, is a key difference between City Challenge 
and UDCs. 
Alms and Criteria of City Challenge 
City Challenge, as with the majority of contemporary urtDan policy, is spatially 
targeted and, in common with UDCs and Enterprise Zones, has a time limited life 
span. Unlike UDCs, City Challenge has no independent legislative base. The City 
Challenge initiative was brought togettier ttirough ttie coordination and adaptation of 
a number of existing policies and funding regimes. Most of the infomiation on the 
powers and aims of City Challenge is contained in the City Challenge 'Bidding 
Guidance' which presents tiie six main aims of tiie City Challenge initiative: 
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- to support strategies for a defined area that will assist that area to attract outside 
investment that will stimulate wealth creation and stimulate wider social provision; 
- to create an environment that will attract people to live and work in the area; 
- to support development and implementation of locally devised plans that will 
benefit significantly local residents and add value to current initiatives in the area; 
- to promote effective mechanisms for the delivery of these plans - including effective 
coordination of resources; 
- to promote partnerships between local authorities, public, private, community and 
voluntary sectors in the delivery of these plans; 
- to develop in local areas the capacity of development to sustain itself after City 
Challenge is terminated. 
The main aims of City Challenge clearly represent both the continuity and change 
that has occurred throughout the era of contemporary urban policy. The search for 
better coordination and targeting of resources has been consistently evident since 
the White Paper of 1977. On the other hand, the idea of partnership has now been 
reintroduced to urban policy, with many different partners identified as having the 
potential to participate in the development and implementation of plans. Overall, City 
Challenge represents a move away from the 1980s style of regeneration to a more 
(potentially) coherent and holistic approach to attacking urban decay. 
City Challenge resources are allocated through a 'competitive bidding approach' 
whereby local authorities submit (in competition with other local authorities) a bid 
document of no more than 5,000 words which establishes strategies, objectives and 
outlines plans for the regeneration of a defined area. The DoE recommend that bids 
should 'clearly relate to the economic, housing, environmental, social (including crime) 
infrastructure and other factors that affect the prosperity and well being of the area 
and its residents'. 
The Bidding Guidance clearly states that the bid document should provide 
opportunities and the means for local residents (and other adjacent communities) to 
benefit from regeneration (Action for Cities, 1993, p2). This statement has been 
welcomed by many, and at least on the level of rhetoric, appears to be addressing 
the very real issue of regeneration and community benefit. 
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The concept of partnership, in terms of involvement of the private sector, appropriate 
public sector bodies and the community, features frequently in tiie City Challenge 
criteria. Indeed, partnership and ttie effective involvement of the community are 
central to the City Challenge philosophy. 
The City Challenge initiative not only accords local autiiorities a role in urtDan 
regeneration again but potentially, also gives local communities a voice, indeed 
'Creating partnership between to-aditionally sceptical local interests, and engaging and 
empowering communities, changing the way in which local authorities respond to old 
problems are crucial to the original vision of City Challenge' (Paridnson, 1993, p8). 
The concept of partnership within City Challenge offers an opportunity - though not 
a right - for tiie community to influence botii ttie contents and implementation of tiie 
bid. In part this is in response to the failures of urban policy through the UDC 
experiment, to directly address the issues of community participation and community 
benefit. That said. City Challenge is by no means a perfect model; partnership offers 
an opportunity for the community to influence the overall process, it by no means 
guarantees it-
What City Challenge does offer is a fuller meaning to tiie concept of regeneration, 
that until recently, many previous initiatives have failed to do: 'City Challenge has 
wider goals than the achievement of economic and physical regeneration which 
characterised recent initiatives. These are retained but social and human capital are 
given higher priority' (Parkinson, 1993, p8). 
Funding of City Challenge 
Funding for City Challenge has been drawn from existing public expenditure and is 
top sliced from seven different funding regimes. Because City Challenge has no 
independent statutory basis of its own it operates ttirough the seven mechanisms of 
ttiose funding regimes - Urban Programme, CAT Special Budget, Estate Action, Local 
Authority DLG, Private Sector Housing Renewal, City Grant and non Local Authority 
DLG. 
In the Bidding Guidance and Financial Guidance notes published by tiie DoE, no 
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prescriptive model is given for the mix of funding implemented at the local level. The 
criteria for each individual funding regime has changed somewhat in order that: 
'separate regimes can combine flexibly and effectively to achieve City Challenge 
objectives' (Action for Cities, 1992). For those local authorities which are successful in 
the bidding process, £37.5m is made available by the DoE over a five year period at 
£7.5m per year. Total expenditure on City Challenge in 1992 -1993 was £52.1 m 
(DoE, 1994), in 1993 -1994 this has risen to £223.2m. City Challenge expenditure 
now comes under the control of the Single Regeneration Budget and these existing 
City Challenge commitments within the SRB are ring fenced. That said: 'The 
cancellation of a third round of City Challenge....seems to indicate that the 
govemment has got cold feet about this particular experiment'. This may be, in part, 
due to the fact that '..City Challenges are too close to local govemment: they are 
suspect and have to be watched' (Robinson and Shaw, 1994, p5). 
City Challenge financial an-angements provide local authorities with powers to 
bon-ow money on non Housing Revenue Accounts projects. That said, the level of 
bon-owing on these projects will be reflected in the Standard Spending Assessment 
(SSA) calculated by central govemment each year for local authority expenditure. 
This may well affect non City Challenge areas within City Challenge authorities in 
ternis of resources available for local service provision. 
Local authorities bidding for City Challenge resources are required to submit bids for 
one area only and be prepared to make their presentations shortly after the closing 
date for the bid documents. In the initial City Challenge competition bids were to be 
submitted by 22nd April 1991 and authorities were notified of their success by the 
end of July. Successful authorities then had to prepare detailed Action Plans for the 
implementation of their proposals. However, unlike preparation for bids, local 
authorities were allowed to apply for the use of UrtDan Programme resources towards 
the cost of preparing a detailed action plan. The final release of City Challenge funds 
is dependent upon the relevant govemment departments being satisfied that the final 
strategy supports City Challenge objectives and that the Action Plan is supported, 
in writing, by all the key partners. Once a local authority has negotiated these 
obstacles they begin, from the start of that financial year, to implement and 
operationalise their Action Plans. 
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All four local authorities on Tyneside, Newcastie, Gateshead, South Tyneside and 
North Tyneside have submitted bids to City Challenge in 1992 and 1993. Only two, 
Newcastie and North Tyneside, have been successful. Newcastie was one of 
eleven 'pacemaker' authorities in ttie 1992 competition whilst North Tyneside was 
successful one year later - bringing tiie total of City Challenge auttiorities in England 
to 31 .The following sections review ttie progress and achievements of one of ttiese 
successful authorities - North Tyneside. The analysis begins by considering the 
profile of tiie area and then examines the Action Plan developed to address tiie 
area's problems. The final section reviews progress made so far in relation to the 'key 
output' measures defined by ttie DoE. 
North Tyneside City Challenge 
The North Tyneside City Challenge (NTCC) area incorporates a densely populated 
area on the North bank of the river Tyne. The area lies in close proximity to the 
riverside strip which, until recentiy, provided tiie majority of employment in ttie area. 
Many of the residents of the area were employed in industries associated witti ship 
building and heavy engineering. Recentiy, ttie closure of Swan Hunters shipyard 
and the reduction in ttie work force of AMEC Offshore has had a significant impact on 
the local economy. 
The City Challenge area is 1,128 hectares in size and runs ft-om North Shields in the 
east to Wallsend in the west, a distance of approximately three miles. Both North 
Shields and Wallsend town centres are within the City Challenge area and both 
have declined in recent years leaving a poor selection of shopping facilities and a 
number of low cost retail and food outiets. This is in part due to the development of 
out of town supemnarkets in the local area, but also tiie ain down nature of the town 
centres themselves. 
There are two main residential estates in the Challenge area - Meadow Well estate 
and Howdon. The former gained notoriety in 1991 when a riot occun-ed on the estate 
in September, sparked by the death of two local young men killed in a car crash 
whilst being chased by the police. The riot also reflected tiie deep economic and 
social distress that had become commonplace on the estate. Howdon suffers from 
similar economic and social problems. 
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The City Challenge area is divided in two by the A19 Corridor, which runs north to 
south and forms a link with the Tyne Tunnel. The majority of available development 
land is concentrated around this area. 
The overall population of the City Challenge area in 1991 was 36,600. 
Unemployment was 18% (DEmp, 1993), compared with a Borough average of 
11.5% and a Tyne and Wear rate of 13.2% (TWRIU,1993). Unemployment on some 
estates exceeded 40% (Craig and Hope, 1993). Unemployment in the Challenge 
area has been an intractable problem over a number of years, and with recent 
closures is set worsen. On a number of other indicators, the City Challenge area 
compares unfavourably to the wider Borough of North Tyneside. 
City Challenge North Tyneside 
1981 1991 1991 
Owner Occupation 
Households No Car 







Manual Wori<ers 58.2% 50.8% 
(NTCC, 1991) 
In temis of owner occupation and households with no car the position of the 
Challenge area between 1981 and 1991 has improved. That said, at the 1991 
Census owner occupation was only 35.9% in the City Challenge area compared 
with 60% in the Borough as a whole; levels of households with no car is high at 
67.7%, compared with a Borough total of 46.7%. Although in absolute tenns 
conditions in the City Challenge area are improving, compared with the sun-ounding 
Borough they remain significantly worse. This is further reflected in the fact that 
between 1971 and 1981 the area's population fell by 26% (OPCS 1971,1981); 
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between 1981 and 1991 a furtiier 9% moved away from the area. 
Whilst the Borough's Standard Mortality Ratio (based on 100) is above the national 
average at 112, tiie very high level of 143 (one of the highest in the North) indicates 
tiiat the City Challenge area has serious healtii problems, which are concentrated 
within the areas of Howdon and Meadow Well. Target crime (per 1,000 population) is 
one third higher (at 137) than tiie rest of the Borough. Crime, vandalism and the fear 
of crime are serious problems witiiin the City Challenge area and in particular on 
Meadow Well. The heavy reliance upon manual work in the Challenge area, at 
58.2%, has caused many problems, mostiy as a result of tiie confraction of the major 
employers in the area, and will continue to do so as the remaining heavy engineering 
and industrial employers restiticture or close down Uieir existing operations. 
Consistentiy higher levels of unemployment, poor health indicators and higher than 
average levels of mortality, crime, vandalism and clear evidence of poor housing 
conditions in the City Challenge area have all combined over a number of years to 
create a socially and economically deprived area tiiat bears many of the hallmari<s of 
tiie inner city problem (See Harrison, 1983; Robson, 1988; Byrne 1989; Barke and 
Tumbull, 1992). 
North Tyneside City Challenge - 'Vision for the Future' 
Nortti Tyneside's City Challenge Action Plan, submitted to ttie DoE in 1992, remains 
committed to tiie vision of success outiined in tiie original bid; 'a vision of an area 
regenerated and reestablished as a clean and healttiy community where families 
want to live, companies want to invest, and people have the opportunity to wori<' 
(NTCC, 1992a, p i ) . 
Nortti Tyneside City Challenge (NTCC) aims to achieve ttiis vision in three main 
ways; 
* strengthen the local economy, and by doing so, increase tiie opportunities of 
residents botti in the Challenge area and across the community; City Challenge aims 
to strengttien ttie local economy ttirough major business development initiatives and 
capitalising upon employment opportunities tiiat ttiese produce. It is hoped that 'a 
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new engine for economic growth' will be created over the five year time scale; 
* deepen the aspirations of local people, to generate entrepreneurial activity, active 
citizenship and spirit of community; employment by large companies on Tyneside 
has stifled, NTCC claim, the 'entrepreneurial nature and capacity of the individual'. 
This has combined with inadequate community facilities, poor housing conditions and 
unemployment to create an environment where local people fail to participate in the 
life of their communities. Increasing the level of enterprise from the individual and 
motivating people to participate in their communities are key targets of City 
Challenge; 
* widen horizons of residents through the creation of new jobs, a cleaner 
environment, greater choice of housing and high quality local services. The Action 
Plan strategy aims to lower unemployment, increase staying on rates in further 
education, expand training provision, create a cleaner greener environment, reduce 
crime and increase community activity. 
Subsequently; 'A strengthened local economy will combine with deeper individual 
aspirations to create wider horizons of opportunity for people in North Tyneside's 
City Challenge area' (NTCC, 1993, pi .1). 
All the main aims and targets of NTCC's Action Plan cleariy relate to the severe social 
and economic problems that exist in the Challenge area. Periiaps more importantly, 
though, the Action Plan makes repeated references to community participation, the 
skills local people have to offer, the development of a 'new local community spirif and 
the promotion of active citizenship. Unlike initial documents published by TWDC, 
NTCC's documents refer frequently to the human aspects of regeneration. 
End State Vision; The First Five Years 
NTCC establishes a clear set of targets which they aim to reach within their five year 
time span. NTCC hopes that developments and progress made during their five 
year programme are built upon and further developed post 1998, and that 
partnerships established during this period will, at the very least, be maintained. By 
the end of five years of action, NTCC aims to: 
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- achieve major facelifts for Wallsend and North Shields town cenfres; 
- 'lever in' over £200m, including £160m private sector investinent; 
- ti-ansform the environmental image of ttie area by a massive ti-ee planting scheme 
and landscaping exercise especially in tiie A19 comdor and housing estates; 
- reduce crime by 5%; 
- enhance five schools to provide a wide programme of leisure and 
community facilities; 
- rejuvenate two public open spaces - Wallsend Dene and Smiths Park; 
- complete the constmction of tiie Meadow Well Community Village, a local centre in 
Howdon, and support over 100 voluntary and community projects; 
- achieve significant improvement in residents' health and reduce tiie gap witii tiie 
wider Borough; 
- ensure the continuation of revenue funded projects by adjusting ttie programmes 
of tiie Council and other agencies to reflect tiie priorities established under ttie 
City Challenge programme. 
NTCC believes it can realistically achieve these targets over the next five years, 
however: 'it is recognised that the delivery of the five year programme will require 
constant effort and commitment to maintain and sti-engtiien tiie partnership and 
overcome the occasional obstacles' (NTCC, 1993, p1). 
In order that the end state vision can be achieved within tiie time scale, ten strategic 
objectives have been developed that together with the 'operational objectives' 
(details on specific projects) provide the overall framework for delivery, monitoring 
and evaluation of the whole programme. 
Strategic Objectives 
Within each Strategic Objective a number of operational objectives identify the 
specific projects to be funded by City Challenge. Each operational objective outiines 
the type of project - flagship, non delegated or complementary project - funding 
sources and partners. This information is both detailed and sizable, so for the 
purpose of this discussion the general strategic objectives will be outiined and the 
progress toward the first year targets will be discussed. 
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Increase Employment; to create 3,400 jobs and a further 2,700 construction jobs 
and additionally reduce unemployment in the Challenge area to the Borough average. 
This will be achieved by increasing training opportunities, linking residents to jobs 
and increasing available child care; 
Develop Industry and Commerce; City Challenge will undertake development for 
business and industry, image improvement of the area and development of 
infrastructure in the area. The landscaping of 120 hectares of industrial land and the 
creation / improvement of 150,000sqm of industrial retail and commercial floor space 
will take place - mainly around the A19 con-idor; 
Raise Skill Levels; training has been included in nearly all areas covered by the 
Strategic Objectives. The enhancement of skills, through the provision of 150,000 
training weeks and intended qualification of 5,000 people is central to raising skills in 
the area; 
Enable Business; increasing access to new markets and creating and sustaining 
employment; 
Improve Housing; in association with Estate Action and the Housing Corporation 
Meadow Well housing estate will be transformed. This strategic objective, which in 
terms of funding is one of the major objectives, will be achieved by the construction 
of new housing, the refurbishment of existing homes and the clearance of unsuitable 
dwellings. Self build projects will also be encouraged and action will be taken to 
diversify tenure and improve the private rented sector; 
Improve the Environment; development of parks and open spaces to enhance 
the physical appearance of the area will play a major role in the regeneration effort. 
The improvements of Wallsend and North Shields town centres will be linked to other 
strategic objectives, such as improving housing and the creation of employment; 
Reduce Crime; this will be particularly aimed at prevention, working with young 
people and reducing the fear of crime. The aim is to reduce the level to that of the 
Borough as a whole.; 
Improve Leisure Facilities; through new community, leisure and education 
provision, increased use of schools, play and arts initiatives. City Challenge will 
attempt to improve the quality of, and access to, leisure facilities; 
Developing Communities; The development of community spirit and participation 
is a key strategic objective for North Tyneside City Challenge' (NTCC, 1992, p2). 
This will revolve around the improvement of community facilities and training for the 
voluntary sector. Participation in the City Challenge process is an issue that NTCC 
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are eager, and willing, to address; 
Improve Health; this strategic objective will be based around education and 
information on health issues. This will be particularly concentrated around Howdon, 
the area with the worst health indicators in the Borough. 
Expenditure on Flagship Projects 
If we briefly examine expenditure on each strategic objective it is evident where the 
financial priorities of City Challenge in North Tyneside lie: 
Strategic Objective City Challenge Funding 
£•000 % 
Total All Other Sources 
£'000 % 
Improve Employment 6,229 16 24,602 12 
Industry and Commerce 14,525 38 136,614 66 
Raise Skill Levels 488 1 484 0.2 
Enable Business 444 1 4,739 2 
Improve Housing 7,012 18 31,441 15 
Environment 1,611 4 500 0.2 
Reduce Crime 330 0.8 347 0.1 
Improve Leisure 1,389 3.7 1,128 0.5 
Develop Communities 3,034 8 4,970 2.0 
Health 929 2 150 0.07 
Administration 1,500 4 — — 
TOTALS 37,500 100.0 204,975 100.0 
(NTCC, 1993) 
In temns of financial support, the development of industry and commerce in the City 
Challenge area commands the lion's share of the resources. Over the five year 
period £14.525m is planned to be spent on industry and commerce which amounts to 
over 38% of the total budget of £37.5m; this strategic objective (it is estimated) will 
attract over £130m from other sources - botii public and private. The majority of 
spending on industry and commerce will be spent in the A19 Corridor area, indeed at 
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the end of the five year programme over £12m of the £14.5m to be spent on industry 
and commerce will be spent in the A19 Conidor development area. £11.367m will be 
spent on three main flagship projects - A19 Corridor Landscaping, Hadrian Park 
provision of office space and A19 Corridor infrastructure. The only other flagship 
project under this objective is the redevelopment of Union Square, North Shields for 
the provision of commercial premises at a cost of £1.023m City Challenge funding. 
Clearly, the main emphasis of North Tyneside City Challenge's programme is the 
development of industry and commerce in the A19 Comdor. 
The next most resourced strategic objective is the improvement of housing within the 
flagship project of Union Square (also a flagship project under strategic objective 2) 
which commands 67.2% (£4.712m) of tiie total £7.12m to be spent on improved 
housing. That said, significant resources from other funding sources - Estate Action, 
Housing Corporation and Housing Association - amounting to £31.441m will be spent 
on housing improvement. Overall spending on housing improvement by City 
Challenge amounts to 18.7% - half that of industry and commerce - but is backed 
substantially by funding from other sources. 
Financial commitinents to increasing employment amount to £6.229m of City 
Challenge funding with tiie majority of this total, £4.703m (76.4%), being allocated to 
the Riverside Training Centre. This Centre aims to provide 125 Child Care places, a 
Child Care facility and a complete training centre of 2.452m2. An overall commitment 
to training Is cleariy evident throughout the Action Plan and this is furtiier reinforced by 
Tyneside TEC's commitment to allocate £21 m in the next five years on ti-aining 
initiatives alone. The issue and delivery of ti'aining to local people forms a very 
signiticant part of the overall action plan. 
One of the key problems in the City Challenge area is that prolonged periods of 
poverty, economic and social decline have combined to damage community spirit and 
reduce levels of provision for local communities. It is estimated that £3.045m will be 
spent by City Challenge on 'developing communities' (8 .1% of the overall budget) 
and this will be complemented by £4.97m from other funding sources - TEC, Local 
Authority, ESF, etc. Over 78% (£2.394m) of total City Challenge resources will be 
spent on the two main tiagship projects - the completion of Meadow Well Community 
Village and the Howdon Community Regeneration scheme. Under this strategic 
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objective it is hoped that 3,070 training weeks will be created, 12 community facilities 
developed and 16 community schemes assisted. Whilst it is clearly accepted that 
the development and integration of local communities into the City Challenge process 
will be essential if the whole programme is to be successful, much of the investment 
aimed at developing communities is going into two main areas - Meadow Well and 
Howdon. 
The only other strategic objective to contain a 'flagship project' is 'Improvement of the 
Environment'. Over £1.6m is expected to be spent on environmental improvements, 
of which 75% - £1.2m will be allocated to the Smiths Park Regeneration flagship 
project. The Smiths Park Regeneration will improve 11 hectares of land, create 38 
construction jobs, one park and one play facility. In addition to this, Smitiis Park will 
fonn a physical link with the Royal Quays and provide residents of this area with 
recreational and ti-aining facilities. Accordingly, TWDC have contributed £250,000 to 
the cost of tiie development. 
The remaining four strategic objectives - Raising Skill Levels, Enabling Business, 
Reducing Crime and Improving Leisure Facilities - account for 7.0% (£2.6m) of City 
Challenge spending over ttie tive years. No flagship projects are proposed under 
any of these headings. 
It is clear after examining City Challenge expenditure ttiat tine development of 
industry and commerce, particularly around ttie A19 Corridor area, is centi-al to the 
regeneration programme over the next five years. Over 38% of total City Challenge 
resources will be allocated to this strategic objective and it is estimated to attract in 
excess of £136m from other sources (both public and private). The improvement of 
housing conditions, if otiier funding is taken into account, is a major part of tiie City 
Challenge programme but perhaps the most significant point to note, alongside the 
concentration upon industry and commerce, is the levels of funding allocated to tiie 
flagship projects. There are nine flagship projects - of which four are under the 
Industiy and Commerce objective. Spending on ttie nine flagship projects amounts to 
£25.5m, or 68% of all City Challenge expenditure. 
NTCC's main emphasis is thus on industrial and commercial development particularly 
around the A19 corridor area. The City Challenge Action Plan clearly states ttiat a 
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new engine for economic growth will be created that will benefit people in the local 
area. But it is the translation of this potential benefit that is important and how it 
relates to local people. Whilst the concentration on a number of flagship projects may 
be the most effective way of targeting resources it does exclude development in 
other areas, such as Percy Main, which have little or no significant City Challenge 
regeneration projects operating within their area. Indeed, many residents in the City 
Challenge area remain largely unaware of what is being built and by whom. 
As a part of ongoing monitoring and evaluation, NTCC are required to produce 
infomriation about tiieir actual perfomnance against forecasts for each sti-ategic 
objective over the past year. The following section explores NTCC's record with 
specific reference to its achievements in terms of projected and actijal job creation. 
Employment Creation 
As we have seen in the previous section, unemployment (18%) is a significant and 
persistent problem within the Challenge area, and not surprisingly 'Unemployment 
....remains the central concern of City Challenge' {NTCC, 1993, p i .7). Furthennore, 
the Chief Executive goes on to state in the 1993 /1994 Annual Report that 'Our 
major business development initiatives are creating jobs and it is the main aim of tiie 
City Challenge partnership to pursue and further increase these opportunities for 
economic growth and employment' (NTCC, 1994a, p3). 
Although NTCC are in the 'same game' as TWDC in promoting their activities and 
achievements, NTCC's monitoring and evaluation, and subsequentiy output 
measures, are far more detailed and explicit (and ultimately useful) about their 
activity. For example, under the broad classification of jobs created four sub headings 
exist; numbers of gross permanent jobs created; numbers of net direct jobs created; 
numbers of jobs preserved; and numbers of construction jobs created. This 
infomiation provides detailed information about new jobs created, those displaced 
from elsewhere and those, such as construction jobs, which are necessarily 
temporary in nature. Unlike UDC output measures, City Challenge evaluation 
information provides a greater potential for evaluating / assessing tiieir job creation 
record over the past year. 
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All too often confusion arises over what jobs are actually new, unlike UDCs, City 
Challenge make this clear. But, it is first important to outiine what NTCC classify as 
new jobs. 'Gross Permanent Jobs' is a way of classifying new jobs in the area and 
those jobs displaced from other areas (whether nationally or locally). 'New Jobs 
Created' counts truly new jobs in tiie City Challenge area. In 1993 /1994, no jobs 
were displaced from elsewhere so the Gross Pemianent Jobs and Net Job figures 
are the same. Over the tive year programme it is estimated that 350 \obs will be the 
result of displacement. 
Information in ttie 1993 /1994 Annual Report is far more detailed ttian information 
provided in TWDC's corresponding publication. A summary of Key Outputs, Core 
Outputs, Expenditure by Project is all provided as well as details about individual 
projects. City Challenge officers are also willing to provide detailed information on all 
aspects of their activity. Unlike TWDC, NTCC are open, accessible and provide 
clear and accurate data concerning their employment creation activity. Unlike TWDC, 
City Challenge Board papers are freely available for consultation by the public so it 
is possible to look at what they are toying to achieve and whettier they are 
succeeding. 
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North Tyneside City Challenge - Employment Creation -1993 /1994 
Action Plan - Original Actijal Difference 
Increase Employment 18 19 +1 
Develop Industry and 
Commerce 247 252 
Raise Skill Levels 11 6 -5 
Enable Business 523 128 -395 
Improve Housing 9 1 -8 
Improve Environment 0 0 0 
Reduce Crime 10 18 -^S 
Improve Leisure Facilities 1 0 -1 
Develop Communities 11 12 +1 
Improve Health 7 8 +1 
Project Administi-ation 4 8 +4 
T O T A L S 840 442 -398 
In its first year of operation NTCC aimed to create 840 new pemianent jobs, 
concentrated mainly within two strategic objectives. Develop Industry and Commerce 
and Enable Business (770 of the 840 total). The most striking feature of tiie above 
table is the large underachievement of jobs in total; altiiough 840 jobs were expected 
to be created only 442 actually existed at tiie end of the 1993 /1994 financial year. 
This shortfall is almost solely as a result of underachievement in the Enabling 
Business strategic objective. Of 523 jobs that were expected to be created only 128 
actually were, an under perfomance of 395. The majority of tills under perfonnance 
was due to tiie failure of the Union Square fiagship project in North Shields to create 
any significant job opportunities. During 1993 /1994 some £3.8m has been invested 
in Union Square, of which £1.4m has come ft^om NTCC. A major extension to North 
Tyneside Business Centre (North Tyneside Council operated) was estimated to 
create 300 jobs. The slow pace of development on this project has meant that only 
106 new jobs have been created. NTCC has been forced to reassess their job 
creation estimates for the five year programme. The Action Plan envisaged 3,402 
jobs being created but this has been reestimated at 2,875, a reduction of 527, after 
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ttie tirst year. The shortfall in the first year is unlikely to be picked up in ttie futijre. 
The reduction in ttie five year estimate refiects two problems. One, ttiat ttie Union 
Square development has largely under performed. Two, tiiat employment creation 
around the A19 Corridor area will not produce the 1,000 expected jobs. The demand 
for factory and commercial space has been overestimated. The lack of interest in ttie 
area has been caused mainly, NTCC argue, by ttie impending announcement of an 
Enterprise Zone for North Tyneside following the collapse of Swan Hunter's 
shipyard. As a City Challenge officer commented, 'Knowing whether we are to get an 
EZ or not would be better than tiie cun'ent situation. Investors are holding back to see 
what develops in the future; with only four years left to run, this situation is likely to 
affect our outputs quite seriously for the A19 area'. It appears that, during its first year 
of operation, the stt'engtti of the NTCC programme was largely dependent on 
external political and economic factors. 
Compared with year one outputs, the employment creation record of NTCC 
improved significantiy during 1994 /1995. Alttiough the overall five year forecast for 
net jobs created continues to reflect the underachievement during year one, ttie 
numbers of net jobs created during 1994 /1995, at 519, exceeds botti ttie Original 
Forecast (469 - Decision Letter 1993 /1994) and tiie Revised Annual Forecast (481 -
Annual Review 1994 /1995). During the first year of operation limited numbers of job 
opportunities were created by NTCC, but evidence from year two suggests a 
greater degree of success, and potentially, benefit for local people. NTCC created 50 
jobs more than the Original Forecast (10% increase) and 38 (8% increase) above 
the Revised Forecast. Compared with the 48% under achievement of the previous 
year, this improvement appears significant. 
More recentiy Siemens ( a micro chip manufacturer) have announced plans to invest 
£1bn in a new factory at Hadrian Business Park in the A19 Comdor, witii the 
potential of creating up to 2,000 new jobs. This significant investment will bring the 
development of Hadrian Business Park and Silveriink area back on track. The 
development will provide a major boost to the job creation potential of NTCC, which 
may well increase the total to just under 5,000 over tiie five year life of NTCC. That 
said, there were many agencies involved in atb-acting Siemens to North Tyneside, all 
claiming to have created these jobs. 
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Summary 
The original NTCC Action Plan aimed to create 3,402 new jobs, but after only one 
year of operation tiiis estimate was reduced to 2,875, a reduction of 527 or 15%. This 
is due to poor demand for factory and commercial premises in tiie A19 Conidor area 
and slow progress in the Union Square flagship development. Whilst City Challenge 
do state that 'high levels of unemployment....cannot be solved by bricks and mortar 
alone' (NTCC, 1994a, p2), the size of the A19 Comdor and City Challenge 
contribution to land development and infrastiucture projects might lead to tiie 
conclusion that NTCC is preoccupied with tiie physical aspects of regeneration. 
Whilst NTCC's programme is locally devised and implemented, it nevertheless 
concentrates on tiie bricks and mortar of development. 
Whilst NTCC's programme encountered severe problems in year one, year two 
employment outputs suggest a greater degree of success. The programme has 
another tiiree years to run and, if ttie success of year two can be min-ored in 
subsequent years, may well meet its job creation target. On the other hand, the job 
creation record (and indeed potential) of NTCC must be kept very much in 
perspective. In its first two years of operation NTCC claims to have created 961 
new jobs. But, this can only have a limited impact upon a City Challenge 
unemployment level of 18%, even if tiie majority of ttiose jobs created are filled by 
unemployed City Challenge residents. Moreover, as City Challenge themselves 
say, 'Alttiough we are naturally pleased that City Challenge has brought new 
employment to the area, set against the redundancies at Swans' and elsewhere 
there is still much to achieve' (NTCC, 1994a, p4). 
In many ways the City Challenge initiative should be judged as much more than a 
crude attempt to create larger quantities of opportunities and material assets in an 
area. It is not only tiie numbers of jobs created which is important but how many of 
these actually go to City Challenge residents. The original Action Plan lacks any clear 
reference to how linkages between local people and job opportunities could be 
made. Uttie detail is provided regarding the combination of projects or actions required 
to guarantee success. More recentiy a Local Labour Research Officer has been 
employed to examine local labour recmitinent and ti-aining and has recentiy produced 
a comprehensive report - 'Developing Local Labour Initiatives' (NTCC, 1994b, Draft) 
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- on developing training and employment opportunities applicable to the needs of the 
local area. To date there is little practical evidence of such schemes. 
At the end of ttie 1994 /1995 financial year, NTCC has aeated just under 1,000 new 
jobs. Whilst the programme failed to meet its projected job creation targets by 48% 
(398 jobs) in year one - and this has forced NTCC to reassess their overall 
projections over the five years - year two employment outputs have been 
exceeded. Employment opportunities created by the Siemens project will be large, 
and, potentially, benefit for local people significant. 
Conclusion 
The comparison of TWDC and NTCC cleariy emphasises the diversity of 
programmes that exist under the broad banner of urban policy. TWDC was 
established by legislation that explicitly stated aims, objectives and powers. City 
Challenge, on ttie other hand, emerged from an amalgamation of a number of different 
funding regimes and has no independent legislative framework. Both TWDC and 
NTCC operate within nationally defined guidelines and are funded through the DoE. 
Perhaps the most important difference between TWDC and NTCC is the level and 
way in which resources are allocated. TWDC is allocated Grant in Aid ft-om the DoE 
whilst City Challenge resources are allocated through a competitive bidding 
approach; competition forces local autiiorities to bid against one another for limited 
resources. TWDC is resourced to a far higher level ttian NTCC - TWDC received in 
excess of £45m in 1993 /1994 whilst NTCC received £7.5m; and NTCC has over 
36,000 people resident within its relatively small area whilst TWDC, at inception, had 
just over 3,000 residents. 
The differences between TWDC and NTCC are all too apparent but they do have a 
number of things in common; there are both time limited organisations (TWDC -11 
years, NTCC 5 years); they both operate within specific geographical areas; they 
are both, ultimately, monitored and evaluated by the DoE; and botti operate in an 
area with persistentiy high levels of unemployment. But perhaps one of the most 
striking similarities between the two organisations (and for many the most disturbing) 
is the emphasis upon infrastructure provision. TWDC, as its remit might suggest. 
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spent £150m (67% of its overall Grant Aid of £224m) on land acquisition and land 
reclamation between 1987 and 1995. NTCC will spend neariy 40% of its budget 
(£14.5m) between 1993 and 1998 on assistance to Industry and Commerce - mainly 
in the form of infrastiuctijre provision around the A19 Corridor. Whilst in absolute 
terms TWDC have spent significantiy more resources, NTCC also focuses heavily 
upon the provision of bricks and mortar. 
TWDC and NTCC are distinct in many ways but also demonstrate some striking 
similarities. Initially TWDC paid littie detailed attention to job creation and who might 
benefit from their action. But TWDC has become acutely aware of the issues 
surrounding employment creation. NTCC began with a clear commitinent to creating 
employment through a new engine for economic growth. Officers of both 
organisations now clearly accept that, in an area of persistentiy high unemployment, 
the most meaningful indicator of success for local people is employment creation. 
Both TWDC and NTCC's job creation records have been disappointing. TWDC, 
after eight years of development and expenditure exceeding £225m, have only 
completed one major project, Newcastle Business Parte On ttiis site, out of a total 
3,500 claimed ngw jobs, only 694 new jobs actually existed in August 1992 (with tiie 
benefit of EZ status). NTCC failed to meet its employment target by 47% - 398 jobs 
in total in year one. Whilst this shortfall may be a result of teething problems, 
evidence in revised estimates for subsequent years suggests that tiiis 
underachievement will not be met at ttie end of ttie five year programme; however, 
year two outputs demonsti-ate a significant improvement on year one. Additionally, 
NTCC's monitoring of job aeation is far more open, accessible and reliable tiian ttiat 
undertaken by TWDC. 
Job creation by both TWDC has been more disappointing than NTCC. After eight 
years of investment and development TWDC have created only 14,883 by 31st 
March 1995 - though the degree to which this is a true reflection of actual new jobs is 
debatable. Both agencies have impacted on their areas significantiy in physical 
terms; previously inaccessible river banks have been regenerated and ain down 
town centres have begun to be revitalised. Notwithstanding tiiese arguments, 
TWDC has spent considerably more resources than NTCC in the pursuit of its type 
of 'economic regeneration', but, tiie results in terms of job aeation has been 
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significantiy more disappointing than those of NTCC, even though the latter has 
experienced severe problems in year one and may fail to meet this deficit over its 
five year life span. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
URBAN REGENERATION AND THE COMMUNITY 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s urban policy initiatives paid little attention to tiie twin issues of 
community participation and community benefit, this was largely because; 'The Big 
Idea in urban policy was undoubtedly private sector led property development. 
(see Imrie and Thomas, 1993; Healey et al, 1992) The assumption was that such 
physical regeneration would stimulate wider economic and social benefits: ttie 
operation of to-ickle down'would ensure tiiat the rising economic tide would lift all 
boats' (Robinson and Shaw, 1994, p2). 
By the end of the 1980s the effectiveness of the 'trickle down effect' had been 
thoroughly discredited as a means to address the needs and demands of local 
communities. The London Docklands experiment related little to the social and 
economic problems evident in the local area and development benefited local 
communities little (Brownill, 1990). That said, ttie Docklands disaster did bring into 
question the property led approach being operated by UDCs and as a result of ttiis, 
and pressure exerted by various parliamentary committees, both LDDC and the DoE 
began to reassess their attitudes towards this style of regeneration. London 
Docklands began to develop a social housing strategy and increased spending 
(significantiy) on education, leisure and community orientated projects. The DoE 
began to allow UDCs freedom to place more emphasis on job creation and 
development projects that might produce 'direct community benefit'. By the end of the 
1980s all UDCs found it necessary to make reference to the community - alttiough 
the practical commitment to this area varied significantiy. 
The introduction of City Challenge also brought a new emphasis on community 
benefit; regeneration was not to be based exclusively on property development, it 
now had to address the needs of, and benefit, local communities. City Challenge 
presented an opportijnity for local autiiorities and local communities to participate in 
the management and design of action at the local level. 
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Botti TWDC and NTCC face similar pressures for involving the community in tiieir 
activities and must demonstrate in what ways their developments might benefit local 
residents. UDCs have been left to identify for themselves which communities tiiey 
should seek to benefit and the ways in which they should go about it. City 
Challenge authorities, on ttie ottier hand, have boundaries drawn around large 
residential populations (which clearly dictates who should benefit) and have to 
create working partnerships witii tiie local authority, the voluntary sector and local 
communities. Thus for NTCC the guidelines on community participation and 
community benefit are far more explicit tiian those for TWDC. 
The following chapter seeks to explore how TWDC and NTCC incorporate local 
communities into their respective activities and in what ways, if any, local people 
benefit from their action. The first part of tiie chapter addresses TWDC's approach to 
community participation - via tiie Monitoring Panels - and ttien looks at other potential 
local benefits - grants, community projects, etc. The second section will examine 
NTCC's participative arangements and tiien considers its activities in regard to 
potential community benefit. Finally, a comparison is drawn between the two 
organisations and conclusions made from tiie discussion. 
1. Tyne and Wear Development Corporation - Participation and Benefit 
TWDC has repeatedly made reference to the issues of community participation and 
community benefit. This commitinent has increased over time and evidence can be 
found in every Annual Report published by TWDC. TWDC cleariy appreciate the 
benefits tiiat highlighting tiieir community related activities can generate. 
The consultancy studies establishing TWDC (Price Wateriiouse, 1987), made little 
reference to ttie community and how ttiey might benefit, or be affected by, proposed 
developments. It was ttie Corporation's first Annual Report, published in 1988, that 
first referred to tiie issues of public consultation, social housing and training provision 
under the broad banner of "Action with Care'. In every Annual Report since tiien 
TWDC have emphasised their community related activity and expenditure. 
By 1989, TWDC had become explicit about ttieir commitment to local communities. In 
'A Vision for tiie Future' (TWDC, 1989d) TWDC sti-ess that ' Urban regeneration 
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must strengthen the area's economic base, create a better environment and improve 
social conditions. It must, in other words, bring real benefits to the area and its 
people' (TWDC, 1989d, p26). TWDC's commitment to the community was furtiier 
underiined by TWDC's willingness to interpret their remit in wider geographical terms 
tiian just ttie UDA; '....community development and the involvement of local people 
cannot be confined by a boundary which may be appropriate in land use terms but 
is not relevant to the relationship local communities have (or could have) with the 
riverside, or their economic and social needs' (TWDC, 1989c, p26) TWDC 
continued, to state that 'We will ensure that our developments benefit these 
communities'. 
The front cover of TWDC's 1992 Annual Report makes clear the Corporation's 
attitude toward regeneration: 'We have never judged our effectiveness in 
regeneration solely in terms of bricks and mortar. We have always believed that it 
must sti-engthen communities in areas of dereliction or decline by bringing back 
economic, culttjral and social life in a long terni, sustainable form" (TWDC, 1992). 
Furthermore, TWDC say that benefits should be shared by local people and that 
local communities should decide for themselves how ttiey should benefit. 
After seven years of operation TWDC openly acknowledges that local communities 
need to participate in their activities - 'Direct community participation is a key element 
of ttie Corporation's regeneration programme' (TWDC, 1994, p29) - and also benefit 
from development - 'All programmes and projects in our areas will be designed and 
built to bring benefit to tiie adjacent communities as a major consideration' (TWDC, 
1989a, p27). But, does rtietoric found in TWDC's Annual Reports match ttie reality 
of TWDC's action. In what ways do ttie community participate in, and benefit fi-om, 
TWDC's regeneration sti-ategy? 
At designation, TWDC's UDA did not contain a significant residential population and 
only recentiy have people moved onto the flagship sites of St. Peter's and Royal 
Quays. TWDC might have interpreted its remit rigidly and concentrated exclusively 
upon communities inside ttie UDA. However, ttiey did in fact look to adjacent 
communities for consultation, mainly around ttie flagship sites. As a senior 
Corporation Officer commented, development sites have a 'zone of effect which 
naturally affects those communities adjacent to TWDC developments. This, it seems. 
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is a major reason why TWDC has targeted communities adjacent to its UDA. The 
Corporation have expressed this commitment formally in their 'Sti^ategy for 
Community Development' published in 1989. The document established the 
Corporation's commitment to tiie community outside of the UDA and also outiined ttie 
two main elements for involving local communities and considering their needs 
(TWDC, 1989b): 
- consultation, communication and local involvement in developing schemes; 
- enabling and ensuring community benefits, through the provision of training; 
recruitment, social housing, cultural and social activities and facilities. 
This document and otiiers on Access for the Disabled and Water Sports Use, cleariy 
demonsti-ate tiiat TWDC are sensitive to tiie needs of local communities. Moreover, 
TWDC have outlined ways in which these objectives might be achieved in practice. 
Community Participation and Consultation 
Apart from being required to consult witii ttie DoE and, to a limited extent, ttie Local 
Authorities covered by the UDA, TWDC do not have to discuss their activities with 
any otiier organisations - this includes local communities. Nevertheless, TWDC has 
developed a mechanism through which local people can, and are, consulted. This 
mechanism is commonly known as ttie Community Monitoring Panels. 
Monitoring Panels have been established around tiie tiiree main flagship projects on 
East Quayside, Newcastie; Royal Quays, North Tyneside; St. Peter's Riverside, 
Sunderiand. All Panels meet on a monttily basis bringing togetiier TWDC Officers, 
members of local communities and ottier relevant representatives from otiier 
organisations - TEC, Employment Service etc. TWDC provide funds for the running 
costs of each Panel and also fund two Infomiation Wori<ers attached to tiie Tyneside 
based Panels. TWDC's commitinent to ttie Monitoring Panels is cleariy evident; that 
said, TWDC place great emphasis on publicising this activity. 
Monitoring Panels arose out of an interest expressed by two clergyman in the East 
Quayside area about tiie nature and impact of the proposed flagship development 
ttiere. Out of this concern emerged the East Quayside Group - a collection of 
interested individuals and Councillors - who began to attack the Corporation, not only 
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about the development, but also the lack of consultation with local people. TWDC, 
worried about bad publicity, approached the Chair of the East Quayside Group 
about these problems and in 1989, the first Monitoring Panel was formed. Shortly 
afterwards a Panel was established at the Royal Quays and subsequently in 
Sunderland. 
Each IVIonitoring Panel is distinctly different, with different types of membership 
exhibiting varying interests. East Quayside Monitoring Panel was initially dominated 
by Councillors and activists; more recently members have come from other residents 
groups in the local area. Royal Quays in its first two years was highly factionalised 
with membership coming from strong community organisations in and around the 
Meadow Well. More recently the Panel has widened its representation to other local 
areas around the Royal Quays as well as the Royal Quays itself. St. Peter's 
Riverside was, and to a large extent still is, dominated by local site and leisure 
interests disrupted by TWDC's development. 
Overall, Monitoring Panels are regarded as being useful mechanisms which allow 
local people to discuss, find out and comment upon development in their areas. 
Members of the East Quayside Monitoring Panel, including the Chair, have 
commented that 'being face to face with the people is a good thing. Knowing who 
you are talking too, instead of an organisation, helps a lot'. Whilst this is certainly true, 
and Monitoring Panels do give TWDC a 'human face', other members have been 
less enthusiastic. One of the general feelings has been that the information coming to 
Panels is often too late and that 'everything is done and dusted when we [local 
residents] find out . Others have been more cynical 'they just tell us what they want 
us to know'. That accepted, the expertise that has built up over the years and the 
employment of paid workers has meant that members of the Panels do not always 
take things on face value. Certainly at the Royal Quays TWDC Officers are 
questioned thoroughly about their activity. 
Monitoring Panels have encouraged local residents and community groups to become 
involved in flagship developments and have kept community issues firmly on 
TWDC's agenda. The Chair of the Royal Quays Monitoring Panel described their 
action as 'constructive confrontation, constantly pressing TWDC for benefit and 
information'. Other Monitoring Panels have more of a 'cosy relationship' with the 
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Corporation and have withdrawn from the Monitoring Panel Forum (a group which 
meets to discuss strategic issues relating to TWDC and the Monitoring Panels) afraid 
that this group may affect their cun-ent 'good relationship' with TWDC. That said, all 
Monitoring Panels have secured benefit for local communities in a variety of different 
fomis. 
At the Royal Quays one of the main interests of the Monitoring Panel has been the 
related issues of employment and training. Together with secondees from Tyneside 
TEC, the Monitoring Panel has seen develop a series of customised ti'aining 
schemes to enable people to access new job opportunities. This method has been 
used at both the Twining's tea factory and the Wet 'n' Wild Waterpari< and will be 
used at the proposed Helen McCardle Care Home started in July 1995. 
At East Quayside the major benefit secured has been the development of an Access 
Strategy. TWDC employed a consultant on disabled issues to wori< with the East 
Quayside Monitoring Panel to ensure that the Quayside development was open 
and accessible to everybody. This 'Access Strategy' is now used in all TWDC 
developments and has been accepted as a model of good practice by the European 
Pariiament 
Benefits secured by the St. Peter's Riverside Monitoring Panel have largely reflected 
tiie Panel's local interests associated with the North Dock site. The Panel discussed 
with TWDC the provision of a MAC - Marine Activities Centre - to provide facilities 
for water sports users in the dock area. St Peter's operates on a more localised basis 
(being dominated by site interests) whilst East Quayside and the Royal Quays 
discuss more strategic issues, alongside the day to day business. All though have 
secured some benefit for local people. 
Outside of the three monitoring panel areas consultation exists on a much lower level 
- in some areas not at all. Adjacent to the Newcastie Business Park no Panel existed 
to press for community benefit, although the Corporation did provide some resources 
to the Cmddas Park Development Tmst to provide training and some community 
development work. Similariy, no panel exists at Sunderiand Enterprise Pari<, which 
may emerge as TWDC's premier job creation site, to press for local employment. 
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Outside of tiie Monitoring Panel flagship areas consultation remains negligible. Often 
tiie only contact local communities have with TWDC is through the magazine 'River 
Life' - which outiines, briefly, TWDC's activities in tiie UDA. In non flagship areas 
consultation does not exist at all, although a level of interaction has taken place in 
Hendon where the derelict Janet Fraser factory was purchased and demolished by 
TWDC as a result of local pressure. Nevertheless, some people wori<ing in the 
Hendon area have said that this action was cleariy in response to TWDC 'doing 
nothing in Hendon and feeling guilty about it'. Whether TWDC felt guilty about ttieir 
lack of activity is debatable, but certainly TWDC saw Hendon as a devefopment 
problem and needed to be seen to be doing something. 
Overall, TWDC's consultation is limited. It concentrates on the three main flagship 
developments and neither provides, nor develops, any participative arrangements 
outside tiiese areas. Aside from the popular planning exercise at Churchill Sti-eet -
where TWDC supported the Church Street Development Association to design a 
scheme of 70 houses as a part of its social housing strategy - little consultation, let 
alone participation exists in non flagship areas. For people in other areas, TWDC 
'does what it likes, when it likes' as one community wori<er commented. 
On the Monitoring Panel level, past practice has led to the conclusion that altiiough 
tiiese are useful mechanisms, ttiey do not necessarily guarantee participation. 
Monitoring Panels tend to comment upon projects once ttie final details of that project 
have been decided. Monitoring Panels have little power in directing what type of 
development is to be built and which developer will be appointed to develop the 
scheme. TWDC does consult local communities in and around tiie flagship projects 
but on tiie details of pre - defined projects. Consultation, and certainly any 
participation, exists firmly on TWDC's terms. Monitoring Panels have forced TWDC 
to develop a coherent approach to community consultation but have yet to influence 
the Corporation's overall philosophy and style. 
Whilst consultation and participation is cleariy in tiie hands of TWDC, Monitoring 
Panels are effective stixictures tiiat do provide for some form of accountability 
whereby, at least, local communities can find out about future plans and 
developments. Nevertheless, TWDC has cleariy seen the opportunity to benefit 
from consulting the community in PR temis as much as (if not more) tiie local 
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community sees Monitoring Panels as an effective way of participating in TWDC's 
developments and plans. 
Community Benefit 
TWDC's community benefit activities cover a relatively wide area and whilst many 
people will see community benefit relating closely to their ability to create jobs, other 
activities undertaken by TWDC do relate to the issue of community benefit. These 
can be classified under three main headings; Training; Social Housing provision; 
Community Grants and related activities. 
Tk^lnlng 
TWDC have accepted ttiat many local communities adjacent to development sites 
may not have the appropriate skills to access jobs created in the TWDC area. In 
TWDC's 'Training Strategy' (TWDC, 1990b) the Corporation outlines two main aims 
in respect of training: 
- to ensure local communities have access to training opportunities which will 
enable them to take up any jobs resulting from development; 
- assist inward investors to tap into the most appropriate pools of labour and that 
any ti-aining is tailored to tiieir specific needs. 
(I) Training for the Community 
Both community related training and business training are based upon a partnership 
between TWDC and the local TECs on Tyneside and Wearside. Two Officers are 
seconded from the TEC to TWDC and this partnership has wori<ed well and 
produced significant benefits. 
Much of the community based fraining relates to the mismatch between tiie skills of 
local people and local job opportunities. One way of addressing this has been 
through pre - employment initiatives such as tiie Job Opportunity Wori<shop training 
scheme near the Royal Quays. These courses aim to provide people with an 
opportunity to gain confidence, learn about interview techniques and provide a basis 
forgoing onto further training courses and employment. In North Tyneside 220 
people had participated in the JOW scheme by 12.4.94 and of these 15 people 
entered employment and a further 140 went onto otiier ti-aining schemes. Overall (up 
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until January 1993) 675 people had been through community based training and 94, 
according to TWDC, had found employment. TWDC has also funded an Open 
Learning Centre to assist local people in gaining qualifications in basic word 
processing and literacy and 180 people have achieved certificates in basic word 
processing from Tyneside Open College Federation (to 12.4.92). Whilst the 
amounts of people actually going into full time employment are quite low, tiie 
realisation and practical commitment to this fonn of training by TWDC is encouraging. 
(ii) Business Training 
Alongside pre - employment courses targeted at local people, the Corporation and 
TEC partnership have also developed training courses for people who wish to train 
in specific areas, most notably in offshore work and in the constnjction industry. 
The development of the Wimpey Craft Training Centre at Chirton, near the Royal 
Quays, provides ti-aining for people who are aiming to gain employment in the 
construction industry; by 12th April 1994 474 people had passed through tiie Centre 
of which 60 had gone onto employment, 15 became self employed and 320 emerged 
with qualifications. The Corporation has also invested £250,000 in the Sea Survival 
Centi-e in South Shields. This Centre specialises in training for offshore and oil rig 
wori<. It is hoped that 40% of trainees will gain employment in this sector as a result 
of this training. 
Pertiaps the most effective fomi of ft-aining operated by TWDC is the tailor made 
ti"aining offered to inward investors. The most significant scheme of this type has 
been the customised to-aining organised for ONWA Electronics Television plant in 
South Shields. More than 200 people have been involved in specialised ti-aining 
organised by Tyneside TEC - the majority of these have gone onto pennanent jobs, 
although the exact figures are not available. On the Royal Quays botti inward 
investors, Twinings and Wet 'n' Wild have recruited tiirough tills route. Customised 
training packages have proved to be an effective way of targeting employment at 
local people. 
TWDC has also encouraged ttie constmction industiy, where able, to recruit local 
labour on TWDC's sites. Through tiie 'Code of Conduct botii constixiction 
companies and end users are obliged to supply information to the Corporation and 
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Monitoring Panels about recruitinent and their work force. However, tiiis encourages 
them to recruit locally but does legally force them to do so. Nevertheless, TWDC 
claim that over 300 people have now been recruited through the scheme (TWDC, 
1994). In addition the Employment Service operate offices providing details of 
vacancies from the Royal Quays and St. Peter's flagship sites. To March 1994 
TWDC claim to have helped 400 people into employment through these offices. 
Whilst TWDC's approach to targeting local people for any potential employment 
benefits is encouraging, this must be tempered by the levels and intensity of 
problems evident in the local labour mari<et. Unemployment levels in some areas 
exceed 40% (Craig and Hope, 1991) and the overall need for employment and 
training is something that TWDC can never fully address. 
Overall, TWDC's style of regeneration has had only a limited impact in creating new 
employment. Newcastie Business Park (TWDC's greatest job creation example) has 
very few local residents worthing there and was described by one senior TWDC 
Officer as a 'missed opportunity' - little effort was made to recmit locally. TWDC may 
have developed good mechanisms by which any potential benefit may be 
channelled tiirough to local people, but the lack of any significant new jobs from 
TWDC's activities means ttiat benefit will remain minimal. 
Social Housing 
The fornnal adoption of a 'Social Housing Strategy' (TWDC 1991b) outiined an 
intention by TWDC to constiuct 613 homes, mainly for rent, in parbiership with a 
number of Housing Associations. The majority of tiiese homes, 428, will be built on 
the Royal Quays and St. Peter's flagship projects. TWDC has provided £7.07m of 
£19.61 m of the total housing costs between 1991 and 1994 - 26% of the total. 
TWDC's eariy record of house building focused on the exclusive 277 housing 
development St. Peter's Basin Marina in Byker (which is to be extended by a further 
81 in the near future). This development provided, to quote a much used phrase, 
'yuppie housing', which caused significant concern so soon after ttie Docklands 
problem. More recently, TWDC have developed housing schemes which have 
mixed house type and tenure; over 25% of all housing on the Royal Quays will be 
for rent. Private house builders are now developing on ail major sites and it appears. 
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despite the property recession, TWDC's flagship projects are attracting significant 
housing related interest. 
Community Grants and Otiier Provision 
The TWDC Community Development budget amounted to £1m in 1992/1993 (more 
recent figures are unobtainable) and this expendihjre included expenditure on the 
running of the Monitoring Panels (including paid workers); River Life; local public 
relations - including special events; grants to community groups; and limited revenue 
expenditure on social facilities (community centres etc). 
Expenditure covers a wide range of activity from Infomriation Officers attached to 
Monitoring Panels, a Watersports Officer to promote use of the two rivers as well as 
project funding for tiie Cruddas Park Community Development Trust in Newcastie 
and the Community Care group on Meadow Well. There has also been funding for a 
sculptor in Sunderiand and a major contribution to recreational projects in East 
Howdon. The projects are botii numerous and wide ranging in tiieir scope and 
exhibit many positive and innovative characteristics. The Corporation claims to have 
supported over 300 local initiatives and schemes to March 1994. 
During 1992/1993 80% of the overall support for community development related 
activity went specifically to community and voluntary organisations. £150,000 of this 
was allocated directiy by TWDC mainly in the form of larger grants and tiie remaining 
£250,000 allocated by the Tyne and Wear Foundation. TWF acts as a local grant 
giving agency on behalf of TWDC and have developed a clear framework and 
guidelines for assessing grant applications. Most of TWF's recommendations for grant 
aid are accepted by TWDC's Board. 
More recentiy TWDC have begun to engage in direct community development work. 
The Corporation has provided a temporary community facility on the Royal Quays 
and intend, in tiie future, to replace this with a pennanent building. Members of tiie 
Corporation have viewed the provision of social facilities as essential on the Royal 
Quays, not only as a base for activities, but also as a focus for the community. 
TWDC are also in tiie process of recruiting a part time Community Development 
Worker for the Royal Quays itself. This post will entail tiie management of the 
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Centre, as well as coordinate educational, leisure and other opportunities on site. 
This post is regarded as very important by TWDC and has been well received by 
local residents. 
Summary 
For many people the existence of TWDC will mean very littie, If anything at all. On 
tiie ground confusion often exists about development in areas where a City 
Challenge, Development Corporation and local Council operate in dose proximity. 
The St. Peter's and Royal Quays Monitoring Panels distribute newsletters, tiie latter 
to 2,500 households, and all have good representation, however, it is the same 
organisations and individuals that are represented. The majority of people who do 
know about TWDC will have come into contact witii it ttirough the Monitoring Panel 
or grant application system. Many of these people are already involved in local 
community groups and otiier regeneration initiatives. 
The impact of TWDC's activity in relation to community benefit can be cleariy divided 
into one, the longer temi impacts ti'aining and employment might have, two, shorter 
term effects that grants to local community groups and activities provide. The ultimate 
assessment of benefit for many local people will be how many jobs have been 
created and how many gained by local people. And whilst grants to community 
groups and activities have a much more immediate and tangible effect, they all too 
often offer only short temi benefit to local people. 
Comparison of tiie overall scale and commitment of TWDC's budget to community 
development establishes where exactiy support for the community lies in the 
Corporation's list of priorities. In 1992/1993 £1m was allocated to community 
development set against an overall budget of £42m. In comparison, twice as much 
money was spent on Promotion and Publicity tiian support for the community. 
Whilst a wide range of projects and activities have been funded by TWDC under ttie 
community development heading this is not reflected in the geographical spread of 
resources. The majority of grants are allocated around tiie Monitoring Panel flagship 
developments; little has gone to Newcastie Business Pari< or Sunderiand Enterprise 
Park. The problems in non flagship areas are even more acute; Hendon in 
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Sunderiand has received littie grant assistance fi'om the Corporation and was unable 
(due to being in the UDA) to bid for Urban Programme resources. 
Resources available to the community are not only concenti'ated upon fiagship 
projects but also within certain flagship areas. Most notably, resources have gone 
toward the Royal Quays area and in particular to the Meadow Well estate. This has 
not only excluded other non flagship areas but also areas adjacent to the Royal 
Quays. Communities such as Percy Main and East Howdon have had significantly 
less resources tiian Meadow Well, although many of tiie problems evident in tiie 
latter also exist in tiie fonner. 
A key problem in tiie near future will emerge as new residential communities become 
established within the UDA. Certainly on the Royal Quays, with tiie new community 
centre and new worker soon to be employed, resources will be re - focused within 
flagships and not to areas adjacent to tiiem. Adjacent communities, many of which 
feel distanced from these developments anyway, will begin to lose these limited 
resources made available by TWDC. Many will feel, quite justifiably, that tiiese 
resources would be better targeted on tiieir communities rather tiian ttie emerging 
ones. That said, TWDC has chosen to target these communities in the past, and 
may well, as overall expenditure becomes tighter, decide not to. Whatever emerges, 
one point is undeniable, the power to act and the final decision lies firmly with 
TWDC. 
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North Tyneside City Challenge - Participation and Benefit 
The overall aims of City Challenge not only describe what government wishes to 
see delivered by this initiative, but also the ways in which these objectives might be 
achieved. Resources are allocated tiirough a competitive bidding approach and 
targeted on areas selected on the basis of need, opportunity, a combination of both 
and politics. Unlike UDCs, City Challenge has an identified geographical 'community' 
to target and also directions from ttie DoE on how these people should participate in, 
and benefit from. City Challenge action. 
The DoE states that City Challenge programmes must 'support the development 
and implementation of locally devised plans that will benefit, signiticantiv. local 
residents and add value to current initiatives operating in tiie area' (Action for Cities, 
1993). City Challenge authorities must involve local people in botti the development 
and implementation of their Action Plans and also ensure that local people benefit 
from their activities. 
Through City Challenge, the DoE cleariy recognises the key role local auttiorities 
could play, but ttiis was balanced by a requirement to develop partnerships 
between the local authority and ottier major stakeholders in the area - private, public, 
voluntary and community organisations. The criteria establishing City Challenge 
unarguably state that local communities should play a role in ttie formulation and 
delivery of plans and that local people 'will benefit, significantiy' from the City 
Challenge programme. Unlike the Act establishing UDCs, guidance to City Challenge 
authorities is far more explicit about ttie community and its role in regeneration. 
Accordingly, the ways in which TWDC and NTCC have pursued these issues on 
ttie practical level vary significantly. 
From the development of ttie initial bid document, NTCC cleariy recognised the need 
to fomi an effective mechanism through which the Nortii Tyneside City Challenge 
programme could be effectively implemented. The formation of a Partnership was 
seen as central In developing a strategy that would tackle problems in tiie local area. 
The following section examines the ways in which North Tyneside City Challenge 
has addressed tiie issues of community consultation and whether this has lead to 
any fonn of community participation. The second section will examine NTCC's 
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activities in relation to community benefit. 
Consuitation and Participation 
The Partnership 
Within City Challenge, partnership has a multitude of meanings. Indeed; The 
principle of partnership should not be narrowly perceived as relating purely to the 
design of the implementing agency: it is fundamental to ttie overall concept of City 
Challenge' (Action for Cities, 1992, p i 2). Witti ttiis is mind, it is important to examine 
not only the partnership, but other areas of ttie City Challenge programme that might 
lead to participation. The cento-al part of the City Challenge sti-ucture is tiie 
partnership - which in essence is the delivery vehicle. Cleariy the partiiership has a 
representative function and ttie credibility of ttie overall programme arises out of 
whom sits around the table. Within this stiucture the community plays a role; but it is 
important not only to identify tiie constituents of the partnership but how tiiese 
groups actually relate to each other. The final area to examine is tiie participatory 
arrangements outside of the partnership stiojcture, which in North Tyneside, are found 
in the local Community Development Trusts. 
The North Tyneside City Challenge Partnership Limited has developed an 
organisational fonn based upon a wide degree of interests and expertise. At the 
centre of the stoucture is the 'Partiiership', comprising of four members from each of 
the following five forums: 
Business Forum - which includes all the major employers on North Tyneside; 
Community Forum - representatives from four local areas - Central Nortti Shields, 
Meadow Well, Howdon and Wallsend; 
Housing Forum - drawn from local Housing Associations, house builders and 
developers; 
Economic Assembly - comprising of agencies involved with regeneration in the area 
Nortli Tyneside Counch - three elected Councillors and one Executive Officer. 
The Partiiership Board was incorporated in October 1992 and is responsible for: 
- developing the Vision, Strategy and Action Plan; 
- developing effective working relationships between partners; 
- approving the use of City Challenge funds; 
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- monitoring and reviewing progress; 
- approving in year changes to the Action Plan not covered in the Annual Review; 
- tiie resources and perfomriance of tiie Chief Executive and staff. 
The Board meets on a monttily basis and alternates tjetween discussing business 
and other topics. This will ensure, NTCC claim, that all topics and issues related to 
City Challenge will have a chance to be discussed at the full Board. 
Directly above the Partnership is the Executive Group, where 'to all intents and 
purposes, the real decisions are made', as one Local Autiiority Officer commented. 
The group comprises six members - Chair, one member each fi-om tiie Housing and 
Business Forums, the Economic Assembly and Council whilst two members ft^om tiie 
Community Fomm, 'give community representation a greater voice in decision 
making'(NTCC, 1993, p4.4). 
The Board has been given the responsibility of prioritising projects and autiiorising 
variations in the Action Plan. The Board have also agreed tiiat; 
- all projects over £250,000 are dealt witti by the Board; 
- all projects greater than £10,000 but less than £250,000 are dealt with by the 
Executive Group; 
- projects below £10,000 can be dealt with by the Chief Executive; 
- an emergency power delegation enables the Chief Executive, in consultation witti 
two Board memlsers to take urgent decisions. 
The Local Authority have sti-eamlined ttieir decision making process so that 
endorsement of the sb-ategy and Action Pan give general authority to proceed witti 
the programme. Decisions on individual projects are generally taken through a swift 
delegation process Involving ttie Councils Executive Directors and Committee 
Chairs. 
The delegated powers outiined above give a considerable amount of conti-ol to the 
Executive Group and indeed the Chief Executive. The encouragement to establish 
an 'amis lengti i ' delivery mechanism by centi-al govemment has been cleariy 
adopted by NTCC, and the delegated powers provide ttie potential for a fast track 
system of decision making to operate. That said, fast tracking in North Tyneside has 
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concentrated power in a few hands - most notably the Chief Executive and 
members of ttie Executive Group. 
The North Tyneside City Challenge Board is strongly biased towards the private 
sector, with significant institutional representation; NTCC's Board is dominated by 
local technocrats and bureaucrats. Moreover, tiie North Tyneside Executive Group 
includes a powerful Officer from the local authority (Executive Director level) at the 
top of the decision making process yet excludes elected member representation. 
Given the extent of the decision making powers delegated to the Executive Group 
and the Chief Executive, serious questions must be asked of ttie scope for 
community involvement and local accountability. 
The Role of the Community 
It appears that from the preparation of tiie original bid document tiie community have 
found it difficult to influence otiier members of tiie partnership. The short time allowed 
to prepare the initial applications worked heavily against tiie community in North 
Tyneside. The Bid Preparation Team met six times (NTCC Bid, April, 1992) and 
altiiough the Board was constituted at tiie Action Plan stage, only the local autiiority 
and private sectorwere operating well at ttiis point. This is not surprising; 'The 
auttiorities had six weeks to bring ttieir partners togetiier, consult local people, select 
a target area and draw up a detailed five year plan' (DoE, 1994a, p4). In practice 
North Tyneside Council took the lead with a notable degree of guidance form the 
private sector. The lack of support and resources for the community, combined with 
ttie short time scale, resulted in an Action Plan heavily in favour of capital related 
development projects. 
Nortii Tyneside Borough as a whole lacks coherent community networi<s, and tills 
problem is even more acute in ttie City Challenge area. Altiiough a multi'tijde of 
different community organisations do exist in the Challenge area many overiap, 
refuse to communicate and are suspicious of outside activity. Within the City 
Challenge area only two community forums were effectively operational when the bid 
was being developed, in Howdon and Meadow Well, altiiough more recently a new 
Forum has emerged in Percy Main. Whilst it is tine tiiere were no existing struchjres 
for City Challenge to effectively tap into, the process adopted to establish the 
NTCC Board partly explains the weakness of ttie community position; 'The first step 
89 
was for the Council to promote awareness of City Challenge by use of the local 
media by direct mailing to over 600 individuals, organisations and companies and by 
calling a series of public meetings. This resulted in a number of forums' (NTCC Bid, 
April 1992, p32). Nevertiieless, the evidence of any coherent or stt-ategic approach 
to developing a representative and accountable Partnership ended here, inevitably, 
this has caused quite serious problems for tiie community. 
Representatives of the Community Forum were 'invited' to become members, in one 
case by a senior officer of North Tyneside Council. Whilst those members on ttie 
Forum may well have been elected if a system existed (as ttiree of the four are well 
known and respected local activists), the undemocratic nature by which the 
Community Fomm was formed lies in starts contrast to the Partnership ideals outiined 
by the DoE. 
The problems this lack of coherence creates are many; members of the Community 
Forum have no constituent base and act as appointees of City Challenge ratiier ttian 
representatives of the local community. Whilst members of the Forum are well 
infomied about local issues and competentiy engage in discussion, the overall role of 
ttie Forum appears marginal in the City Challenge process. The Forum has no 
independent support, in professional guidance or resources, and as a result ttie 
community representatives lack a clear directed purpose. This has resulted in a 
number of Community Fomm members leaving ttie Board; new members have found 
it difficult to understand and comment upon projects as a result of ttie scope and 
numbers of projects undenway. 
In Nortti Tyneside community representation is clearly outweighed by professional, 
institutional and private sector representation. The lack of any real input in to tiie 
original bid, tiie lack of support to community representatives, combined witii a low 
credibility and mandate to act on behalf of tiie local community has lead to a great 
concern of what tiie Community Forum can actually achieve. The nature of tills 
concern stems from ttie undemocratic natijre of selection and ttiat ttie Community 
Forum is offered littie independent support and guidance. The fact tiiat a number of 
community representatives were invited to become a part of the Community Fomm 
begs tiie question - Who is consultation for in North Tyneside City Challenge? 
However, the prospects for greater participation have increased as members of ttie 
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Community Forum, tiirough tiieir own forceful personalities ratiier tiian as a result of 
encouragement, have started to make demands with confidence. Nevertheless, the 
overall selection process, lack of support and marginal input into ttie bid preparation 
has combined to place to Community Forum in a weak and compromised position. 
Whilst the partiiership arrangement for tiie community is, to say ttie least, limited in 
North Tyneside City Challenge, ottier structures exist outside of the fomial 
partnership an-angement that have provided the potential for meaningful local 
consultation and participation. 
Community Development Trusts 
NTCC have made attempts to develop, or at least tap into, coherent and 
representative community structijres in two local areas - Howdon and Meadow Well. 
A full time Community Development Worker has been employed, as part of the City 
Challenge team, to work towards the development of a Community Development 
Trust in Howdon. Early in 1995 this wori<er became employed by tiie Trust, once it 
became operational and the new Community Centre was opened. On Meadow 
Well, City Challenge have tapped into the new Meadow Well Development Trust. 
The Trust, which is supported by a newly appointed Development Manager, will 
receive a new built community cenh-e from City Challenge and manage it on behalf of 
ttie whole community. Botii Trusts have representatives from the local community 
who are elected on an area basis; tfiese Trusts, City Challenge claim, 'will help to 
ensure ttiat full consultation takes place to maximise residents' involvement and 
encourage commitment to all planned improvements' (Annual Report NTCC, 1994, 
p i 5). Both Howdon and Meadow Well Development Trusts are closely linked to tiie 
building of new community centi-es in these areas; ttie overall aim is to provide a 
focus for all community groups and activities and to generate a sense of participation 
and ownership of these developments. However, some problems have emerged. 
One of the major issues of Development Tmsts is ttie by-passing of local elected 
Councillors. Local elected members have had littie input into the respective Trusts 
and indeed City Challenge as a whole. Some local Councillors have commented that 
ttie process of establishing Trusts, promoted by City Challenge, undemiines their 
role and delivers a different political agenda. The imposition of extemal stiuchires into 
tiiese two localities was intended to co-ordinate existing action - it appears tiiat, as 
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one local Development Wori<er commented 'although Development Tmsts were 
largely an idea from City Challenge, we have to acknowledge that benefits will go to 
the community and if we do not recognise this we may well loose out'. A senior Local 
Authority officer also remarked that co-ordination on Meadow Well was essential as 
none of the groups on the estate were ti-uly representative. That said, the two 
Development Trusts have provided a democratic sti^ucture whereby local people can 
consult with and participate with City Challenge action - albeit on pre-decided plans. 
Overall, NTCC's record in respect of community consultation and participation Is 
poor. The lack of time and support in the initial stages of producing tiie Bid document 
left the community very much the marginal partner in deciding, or at least discussing, 
what should be contained in the Action Plan. The dominance of the Local Autiiority 
and Private Sector established in the bid procedure, has continued to exist In the 
Partnership today. 
The existence of a Community Fomm, expressing tiie needs and aspirations of local 
people, is essential if local communities want to participate in the process. That said, 
the existence of a stoiicture does not guarantee participation. Whilst there may be 
two Community Representatives on tiie Executive Group, the lack of accountability 
to, or a mandate from the local people, combined witti a lack of support, has left 
community representatives unsure of their role as community representatives. Whilst 
tiie calibre of certain community representatives has meant that demands are being 
made, the lack of meanlngfiji development wori< to create a coherent and 
comprehensive stiucture associated to ttie Community Fomm has left ttie community 
in a consultative rather participative role. 
NTCC has largely failed to create a stmcture whereby local people can participate in 
the plans for their areas. Certainly, Development Tmsts provide this potential, but 
not on projects ttiat have pre defined in tiie City Challenge Action Plan. 
Unfortunately, NTCC is dominated by ttie Local Authority and private sector 
interests in the partnership and the lack of support to ttie community and Community 
Fomm seems to dictate 'ttiat ttie local community, (certainly Nortti Tyneside), had 
relatively little power to influence the contents of the City Challenge programmes', 
furthermore, 'parfriership bodies offer an opportunity for the community to obtain 
influence, but they do not guarantee tiiat influence' (NOVO, 1993, p i 4). Certainly in 
92 
North Tyneside both these statements are true. 
Community Benefit 
In common with the issue of community participation, community benefit is dealt with 
explicitly by the DoE's 'Bidding Guidance' (Action for Cities, 1993). The directions 
clearly state that City Challenge must support development and Implementation of 
locally devised plans and that these should benefit, significantly, local people. Whilst 
it is clear from this statement that local communities should benefit from policy action, 
there is no prescription on how this should be achieved. Closer examination of 
NTCC's Action Plan and 1993/1994 Annual Report outiines a range of activities that 
NTCC engage in that might produce community benefit. These can be considered as 
support for training initiatives; provision of social housing; and grants and other 
resources allocated to the community. 
Employment and Training 
As has been discussed before, one of the most important indicators of success for 
local people is tiie creation of employment. But, the creation of employment in tiie 
local area does not necessarily guarantee benefit for local people. In areas of high 
unemployment there often exists a mismatch between those jobs created and the 
stalls of the unemployed. North Tyneside City Challenge clearly recognises this 
'....City Challenge and our partners in the area are developing policies and 
mechanisms aimed at ensuring that urban and social regeneration programmes 
provide the maximum benefit in respect of employment and training opportunities for 
local people' (NTCC, 1994, p7). Developing a strategic approach to employment 
and training opportunities is the job of the Labour Market Research Officer. It is 
hoped that infonnation provided by the Labour Market Research Officer will increase 
the likelihood that training will be applicable to the needs of the local unemployed and 
lead to full employment after the training period. 
The overall training budget for City Challenge sponsored projects amounted to 
£175,066 (2.3% of the total budget) in 1993/1994. It is estimated that £789,242 (2% 
of the total budget) will be spent on training over the five year period. Whilst in 
percentage temris the amount invested in City Challenge ti-aining projects appears 
relatively low, the development of the Riverside Training Centre at a cost of £4.1 m 
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(mainly capital) will boost training provision to £4.8m or 12% of the total budget. 
Whilst the training centre will not provide training for some time, the development will 
provide a unique Child Care training facility in the country. 
City Challenge may claim to have developed a strategic approach to employment 
and training but some local training providers disagree. One criticism levelled at City 
Challenge training is that although the right areas are being targeted, many of the 
training courses are in the iorm of basic training in a short course fomriat. Whilst this 
does provide the potential for local people to enter into further training courses and 
access higher levels of education, it does not demonstrate that the overall training 
initiative has been strategically thought about. One stark omission from the strategy 
is that no efforts are being made to tackle the second and third generation male 
unemployment problem, and in an area where long temi unemployment is a major 
problem, this failure cannot be ignored. 
In 1993/1994 City Challenge failed to achieve its intended training targets; of 5,282 
estimated training places only 3,880 were created, a shortfall of over 26%. The short 
course emphasis of the training programme has come in for criticism but it does, 
nevertheless, provide a stepping stone for people to access more advanced 
schemes and courses. The jewel in the crown of the training strategy is the Riverside 
Training Centre, where 68% of the total budget over five years is allocated. Whilst 
this facility will provide a unique child care facility in the northern region, reservations 
have been voiced by local trainers on the centre's appropriateness to local 
problems. The ideal of the Centre is unquestionable' remarked one local training 
worker 'but its relationship to the local unemployment problem, now that Swan's 
[shipyard] has closed is less clear'. 
Housing Improvements 
The major concentration of City Challenge action is the construction of private sector 
housing and housing for rent mainly in the Union Square flagship, and Wallsend and 
North Shields town centres. Overall, City Challenge hopes to facilitate the 
construction of 317 private sector houses and 138 houses for rent, for an overall City 
Challenge investment of £7m over five years. City Challenge has also funded the 
demolition of the very unpopular Rawdon Court deck access housing in Wallsend. 
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The major housing improvements in the Challenge area are concentrated around 
North Meadow Well (£10m Estate Action) and Cheviot Housing Association's 
redevelopment of South Meadow Well, now renamed Riverside Park (estimated cost 
£11.24m). This money has been levered in by City Challenge and has created a 
public / private leverage ratio of 1 : 4 . NTCC is not concerned with the direct 
provision of new housing (rented or private) but sees its role as enabling other 
housing providers to develop in the area. In tenns of expenditijre, housing accounts 
for nearly 20% of the overall City Challenge budget. This money is directed toward 
reclaiming / facilitating (much like TWDC) tiie construction of housing rather tiian direct 
provision. 
Grant Allocation and the Activities 
Overall spending relating to 'Developing Communities' (S.0.9) was £552,260 in 
1993/1994 and over the five year Action Plan will reach over £3m. However, closer 
examination of the expenditure reveals tiiat not all of the resources are available 
directiy to the community - much of it is allocated to defined projects and not tiirough 
an accessible grant allocation system. 
The majority of resources under Developing Communities is allocated to ttie Meadow 
Well Community Village, to develop training for local people in the process of building 
a community centre and series of workshops. In excess of £275,000 (49%) of 
resources committed to developing communities has gone to this Meadow Well 
project. In addition to this, over £50,000 has been allocated to Meadow Well primary 
school. Whilst it is certainly true that the estate exhibits some of the most severe 
economic and social problems in ttie area, it has led local residents in adjacent areas 
to comment 'when people think of City Challenge they automatically think of Meadow 
Weir. Certainly, much of the visible work (outside of the A19) is going on in and 
around Meadow Well which is perhaps why some local people harisour this opinion. 
The next largest investment under this strategic objective has been funding allocated 
to tiie Community Education and Leisure Initiative. In total £116,180 was allocated to 
four projects, ranging from £75,000 being allocated to a Sensory and Parents Room 
to just over £7,000 being given to an After School Childcare Facility. Most of tills 
funding has gone to worthwhile and innovative projects but ttirough mainstream 
provision (local schools) rather tiian community led organisations. 
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Aside from a minor grant of £8,550 to the Neighbourhood Initiative the most significant 
source of money directly available to local community groups is the £91,600 in the 
Community Initiatives Fund. The original level of resources committed to this pool 
was only £39,600 but after significant pressure from the community fomm and an 
additional grant from Europe the final total amounted to £91,600 for 1994/1995. During 
1993/1994,14 grants of between £90 and £10,000 were made to a variety of 
organisations. During 1994/1995, 8 grants of in excess of £10,000 have been made, 
with the smallest being £2,610. Again a wide range of innovative and well 
developed schemes have been funded ranging from a Baby Equipment Loan 
Service to the Employment of an Arts Wori<er to wori< with young people with 
disabilities. A sizable grant of £21,776 was provided for Training for the Voluntary 
Sector' organised and delivered by V.O.D.A., a local independent voluntary 
organisation. Training for the Voluntary Sector provides a range of courses for 
voluntary groups in the City Challenge area; the courses have been well attended 
and welcomed by local community groups and the investment is to be continued, 
depending on appraisals, for the five year time scale. 
The Grant Aid Criteria was fomiulated in consultation with the Community Forum and 
the requirements are explicit 'proposals should be aimed at benefiting individuals or 
communities, with cleariy identified social needs' (NTCC, Board Minutes, 2 June 
1993, p4). Furthermore, 'proposals should show direct benefit to City Challenge 
area residents'. Decisions over funding go through the Community Forum, but are 
first sifted by the local authority and recommendations then made to the Fonjm; in 
essence, the Forum only has a consultative role to play in awarding resources from 
the Community Initiatives Fund and has no power of veto. 
The Community Initiatives Fund provides limited (in ternns of £10,000 per project and 
£96,000 in total) funding to local community organisations but does provide a flexible, 
well defined framewori< to directing community benefit towards local people in the City 
Challenge area. On the other hand, these potential benefits must be set against the 
overall total of £96,000 per year (1.3% of total budget) and the fact that resources 
are allocated on a yeariy basis - discouraging continuity. These factors have lead to 
local community workers commenting that the levels of funding as 'tokenist' and that 
NTCC want to 'be seen as doing something for the community'. Whilst accepting 
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this argument, the Community Initiatives Fund does provide resources. 
Summary 
The profile that City Challenge has in North Tyneside is quite high and in general, 
people are aware of its existence. Yet people witii the greatest knowledge and 
interaction with the initiative tend to be the same people who come into contact with 
other regeneration agencies, such as TWDC. This group of people do seem to have 
grasped what City Challenge is about and what it has to offer. That said, the 
realities of the programme differ greatiy from the philosophy behind City Challenge. 
Meaningful participation in City Challenge has been very low in North Tyneside so 
far. Largely as a result of the limited time scale to prepare bids, and tiie lack of a 
coherent community network in the City Challenge area, the local community have 
become junior partners in establishing the context and emphasis of the Action Plan. 
The continuing lack of any financial or other support for the Community Fomm, and 
the lack of any democratic process whereby people are elected onto the Foaim, has 
placed the Forum in a marginal and compromised position within the Partnership. 
Representatives of the Community Forum on the Executive Group may seem to alter 
the balance in favour of the community, but the community's role in City Challenge 
has been consultation rather tiian participation. 
Community benefit, or the ways in which tills may be achieved, is often a 
complicated area to assess. NTCC has made efforts to target any potential benefit 
that may arise out of the initiative and have, rather belatedly, established a training 
strategy to help tackle local unemployment problems. The range of training provided 
is encouraging but the long term commitment to tills area is debatable; most courses 
are short term and relatively basic in nature. The concentration of expenditure on a 
child care training facility is questionable in an area where the unemployment has 
arisen mainly from job losses in manual occupations; the stark omission from ttie 
overall training strategy is how to tackle second and third generation male 
unemployment. 
Spending on 'Developing Communities' at first sight appears quite significant but 
after closer examination it appears ttiat little money is available to fund community 
based projects. The Training for the Voluntary Sector has been well received and 
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has broadened the scope and expertise of many local voluntary organisations. It is 
though the Community Initiatives Fund that offers the greatest potential resource to 
the local community. Guidelines have been established in consultation with the 
Community Forum and funded organisations and grants must benefit local people. 
Nevertheless, the Fund is resourced at a low level and mns on a year to year basis • 
discouraging continuity. Grant sizes are becoming larger and fewer grants are being 
allocated; smaller grants for groups are now being discouraged. 
Overall, NTCC has attempted to address the twin issues of community participation 
and community benefit, but it has largely failed in securing the former and has had 
only limited success in achieving the latter. Whilst NTCC have done little to 
encourage participation, neither has the community forced this onto the agenda, 
concentrating instead on what each particular geographical area can gain from the 
programme. In ternis of benefit, the impact will be low; clearty the wider economic 
context has affected NTCC (e.g. the Swan Hunter redundancy) and political 
decisions (designation of EZ) have stifled development somewhat. Nevertheless, 
the long temn impact that NTCC can hope to achieve will be limited and may be 
judged more on physical tenns - redeveloping town centres and providing 
infrastructure - than its ability to benefit local people's cun-ent circumstances. 
Conclusion 
The comparison of NTCC and TWDC in relation to community participation and 
community benefit demonstrates that the practical ability of an organisation to 
address these issues, does not necessarily reflect the structure itself. TWDC is a 
centrally appointed, powerful quango, that does not have to consult local 
communities whereas City Challenge must fomn partnerships to devise and 
implement its plans. 
TWDC have engaged in consultation and has reacted to local community pressure 
on a number of occasions. TWDC has created structures and resources have been 
committed to the area. NTCC have also established a partnership structure but has 
failed to back this with appropriate resources or professional support. Both 
organisations largely failed to involve communities in the establishment of their plans 
(TWDC by design, NTCC due to time scale) but TWDC's record since has been 
98 
more positive than its City Challenge counterpart. TWDC has established a good 
consultative structure whereby local communities, adjacent to the UDA, can discuss 
and question TWDC Officers and participate, to a limited extent, in TWDC activities. 
That said. Monitoring Panels only exist in three areas. NTCC on the other hand 
operates a Community Forum which fonns no direct relationship between the 
community of the City Challenge area and the partnership. Monitoring Panels bring 
TWDC and the local communities face to face in their respective areas - no such 
mechanisms appear in the City Challenge process. That said, TWDC is ultimately 
more powerful and can ovenide any opposition though chooses not to do so. 
TWDC and NTCC were created against different political backgrounds, placing 
different degrees of emphasis on consultation and participation. What has emerged 
is that both organisations do not enable local communities to participate in 
regeneration; communities may be consulted but are only able to 'tinker about on the 
fringes of the real development process, altering little of what really goes on. 
Community benefit and the ways this has been approached by NTCC and TWDC 
also provides some striking comparisons. Both have engaged in the funding of 
training for local people, the facilitation of social housing, grant giving and other 
related activities. But the level of resources allocated by each organisation to these 
areas cleariy reflects theie overall levels of financial support from central govemment. 
TWDC has three community development staff and approximately £1 m in financial 
resources for community support; NTCC has only one member of staff and 
significantly less resources committed to the community. That said, it has been far 
easier to assess the impact of NTCC. TWDC has no identification of spending on 
social housing and training in its Annual Reports and no published details on what 
voluntary organisations, etc. have been funded. NTCC are required to publish 
detailed outputs related to cleariy defined targets (pertiaps this reflects the fact that 
City Challenge programmes are a little further away from central govemment control 
than is comfortable). 
For TWDC land and property development is the main business whilst community 
related expenditure remains peripheral. NTCC's programme of action also leans 
toward business and infrastructure provision (though not so heavily as TWDC) and 
community issues have largely been marginalised. TWDC's impact in the area will 
be more significant because of the sizes of the developments and resources 
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committed to tiiem. NTCC on tiie other hand has relatively few financial resources 
and can only effect minor change - and this will produce only limited benefit for local 
people. TWDC does consult local people but they do not participate; NTCC has 
the sti-ucture but the practical reality of tiiis means ttiat the community are junior 
partners. Both TWDC and NTCC have addressed community benefit and have 
funded some excellent projects, but, ttie ultimate level of impact reflects ttie resource 
commitment of the two agencies and accordingly each's ability to effect change; both 
organisations have undertaken similar activities in relation to community benefit but 
ultimately it is overall resources allocated ttiat will dictate the relative levels of 
success. In conclusion: 'Such themes as participation, consultation, parttiership and 
community benefit are sti-ongly interiinked and are now commonly thought to t>e 
integral to the process of urban regeneration. Where some or all of these elements 
are weak, the process of regeneration is itself weakened and undemriined.' 
(Robinson, Lawrence and Shaw, 1993, p57). Cleariy for both TWDC and NTCC 




'Within urban policy, most evaluative analyses have 
adopted a correctional framework for measuring tiie 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
intervention however, the use of quantitative 
analyses.... is constrained by the fact that their results are 
heavily dependent on data which are of moderate quality 
and limited availability. In the main, evaluation has tended 
to centre around easily available data which measure the 
outputs of policy, but which give little or no indication of the 
outcomes of policy. This distinction is more than just 
semantic: output measures do not look at the impacts of 
policy, such as reducing crime levels, reducing 
unemployment, creating new jobs or enhancing residential 
environments.' 
Moreover: 
'.... if one is to address tiie fundamental question in policy 
evaluation of 'who benefits?', tiien it is important to gauge 
ttie views of inner city residents - the intended recipients of 
policy....' 
(Deas and Bradford, 1994, p.18). 
Quantifying the outputs of urtDan policy has cleariy been favoured by the current 
Conservative government. Emphasis has to a great extent been placed upon 
measuring success in predominantiy physical terms, the 'outputs' of policy rather 
tiian the 'impacts' or 'outcomes' for local people and communities. 
This thesis has attempted to examine contemporary urban policy from the viewpoint 
of local communities via two cenft-al issues - community participation and community 
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benefit. The twin issues of community participation and community benefit have 
become central to debates about urtDan policy in recent years. However, 
commitment on the level of rtietoric to these issues by central government has (as the 
previous analysis has demonstrated) not translated well in the implementation of 
urban policy initiatives. 
Two main uriDan policies operating on Tyneside in the mid 1990s - Tyne and Wear 
Development Corporation and North Tyneside City Challenge - have, in physical 
terms, impacted significantly within their areas; regenerating tracts of derelict land and 
disused buildings and in the Corporation's case opening up access to the riversides 
once again. Nevertheless the physical impacts the two organisations have had 
bears little relationship to the genuine needs of local communities that live within or 
adjacent to their respective development areas. Unsurprisingly, TWDC has 
invested substantial amounts of public resources upon land reclamation and 
infrastructure development in seeking to meet their remit as expressed in the 'Local 
Govemment Planning and Land Act* (1980). What is surprising (even alanning) 
though is the physically dominated approach adopted by North Tyneside City 
Challenge. The majority of resources of the City Challenge initiative have been 
focused upon infrastructure and commercial development around the A19 Conidor 
area. Whilst many have argued that City Challenge is a significant move way from 
the 1980s style of regeneration - evidence from North Tyneside seems to suggest 
that this move is not anywhere as significant as might be tiiought. 
In terms of employment creation both TWDC and NTCC have failed to impact upon 
the unemployment levels in tiieir areas. NTCC was forced to reassess drastically its 
first year outputs and five year plan after only a few months and whilst evidence 
from second year results are more encouraging, ttie first year deficit will remain. 
TWDC appears to have met their output measures for 1993/1994 (DoE, 1994). That 
said, closer inspection of Newcastle Business Pari<, the Corporation's most 
significant job creating development, demonstrates tiiat botii tiie Corporation and 
Department of Environment are counting 'any job' located on tiie Business Park as a 
tmly 'new job'. Without question, Tyne and Wear Development Corporation has 
failed to create the numbers of 'new jobs' it has claimed. Whilst North Tyneside City 
Challenge is forced to monitor job creation quite sti-ictiy, it would be safe to conclude 
that both the Development Corporation and City Challenge initiative studied have 
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only had a minor impact on the most serious and long term problem on Tyneside -
unemployment. 
When addressing the issue of participation the two organisations have varied in both 
their approach and their relative levels of success. The Corporation (not compelled 
to consult) has developed mechanisms by which some of ttie community can consult 
witii TWDC. Monitoring Panels are an example of good practice. City Challenge 
(obliged to consult) on the ottier hand, was established with tiie issues of 
consultation and participation very much in mind, but, as evidence suggests, has had 
significant problems in addressing these issues successfully. 
North Tyneside City Challenge has made only a limited attempt to consult the 
community and the local community has been forced into a junior position in tiie 
partnership (NOVO, 1993). Whilst both organisations have consulted the 
community - witii varying degrees of success - neither has adequately addressed 
ttie issue of participation. Consultation may inforni tiie community and tiie respective 
organisations of each otiiers' views but do not guarantee participation. Both the 
Development Corporation and NTCC find it expedient to be seen to be 'consulting' 
the community but neither make serious attempts at enabling local people to 
participate in the development process. 
If attention Is directed to the last major area of this tiiesis, community benefit, then 
again stinking similarities can be found between these two very different (at least on 
tiie surface) urban initiatives. Both organisations have attempted to secure 
community benefit in similar ways - facilitating ttie provision of social housing, 
developing appropriate training schemes for ttie long temi unemployed and making 
available grant resources to local community groups. The Corporation have funded a 
variety of projects, both within and adjacent to the UDA, but have more recently 
begun to concenfrate resources within the flagship areas. NTCC have consciously 
targeted their community resources on specific areas - most notably ttie very 
deprived areas of Meadow Weil and Howdon - and this has led to otiier communities, 
adjacent to these areas, becoming marginalised. Whilst TWDC and NTCC have 
specific geographical areas to operate within, ttiey cleariy target certain communities 
within tiiese areas and consequentiy marginalise otiiers witti similar problems. 
Overall, the Corporation has developed a range of strategies under the broad 
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banner of 'community development' and to a certain degree this has been matched 
by North Tyneside City Challenge. Botii organisations have worked constructively 
with other agencies in delivering and developing strategies (notably tiie Employment 
Service and Tyneside TEC) and a number of local people have benefited directly 
from tiieir action. Ultimately though, long temi benefit closely relates to employment 
opportunities available to local unemployed people. Whilst both organisations have 
established mechanisms through which local people can access job opporhjnities, 
the failure of the Corporation and North Tyneside City Challenge to create significant 
employment opportunities (and the lack of jobs in the wider labour mari<et) has meant 
that local people have benefited little from the developments of the Corporation and 
City Challenge initiative. 
As previous chapters have highlighted, cities have long been the focal point of public 
policy action, mainly in response to the worsening economic and social conditions of 
these areas. The lack of economic opportunities for certain groups in society has 
combined with a number of ottier social and environmental factors to create a very 
specific set of circumstances; tiie inner city problem. 
Until recently, the responsibility for addressing this 'urban crisis' has been witti local 
govemment. Municipal action to combat healtti problems in the mid 19th Century 
marked the beginning of local govemment as we perceive it today. Since tiiis period, 
local autiiorities have evolved and developed into complex bureaucratic structures. 
Local authorities have developed a wide range of new programmes and legislation 
and provided a democratic means for a locally accountable service in ttie areas of 
housing, education, health and welfare. But, more recentiy services and policies tiiat 
were once tiie preserve of local authorities have been removed from local democratic 
conti-ol and placed under the direction of centi-ally appointed and centi^ally resourced 
agencies - QUANGOS. The list of functions ti-ansfen-ed away from local govemment 
conti-ol includes tiie Polytechnic sector, ftjrther education, sixtii form colleges, all of 
whom are now managed independent of local authorities and resourced tiirough 
funding councils. More signiflcantiy LMS (Local Management of Schools) and tiie 
National Curriculum have removed local auttiority responsibility for ttie local education 
system. Local Autiiorities have also been prohibited from providing council housing 
and provision has effectively been transfen-ed to Housing Associations and Local 
Govemment representation has been removed from local Healtti Authorities. In many 
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areas where local authorities have been historically involved, little democratic 
representation remains. 
In the area of utban policy, Urban Development Corporations have removed the 
responsibility for regeneration in the areas where tiiey were designated and tiie 
restiucturing of funding regimes has meant tiiat development funds - such as City 
Grant - are paid directly by central govemment. Much of the work in employment has 
been transfen-ed to TECs - Quangos that operate without representation from trade 
unions and local authorities. Whilst City Challenge may appear to be a move away 
from this, some have argued that City Challenge bodies are Quangos themselves, 
with no truly democratically accountable structure. Whilst tiiere are questions about 
the commitment of some local authorities to community participation, tiie ability of local 
govemment to act independently and reflect local need has been curtailed in a 
number of areas over the past 15 years. Locardemocracy has been reduced 
severely by a number of measures introduced by the Conservative government, all 
aimed at reducing the powers, function and democracy of local authorities in England. 
The imposition of Quangos to deliver local autiiority functions has seriously affected 
tiie ability of local govemment to address tiie very serious economic and social 
problems evident in our cities. Whilst local autiiorities are by no means 'Paragons of 
Virtue', tiiey do offer the clear benefits of democratic accountability and local flexibility 
and responsiveness when addressing these issues. 
It is all too easy to criticise approaches to urban policy and whilst the need to 
provide an alternative, or range of measures that might be adopted to address inner 
city problems, should be considered by all those who actively engage in policy 
evaluation, the actual development of an alternative strategy presents some very 
serious barriers to negotiate. The following section outiines ideas that urbar\ policy 
should be aiming to achieve and by what measures, but is not prescriptive or fully 
comprehensive. Policy advisers and politicians have striven for years to develop an 
urtDan policy that would solve the inner city problem, so the following discussion can 
only be regarded as a very minor contribution to this debate. 
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1. Co-ordination of National Policies 
The idea of co-ordinating policy action is nothing new but attempts made in 
the past have largely failed. Regeneration policies will not be successful if 
wider policies in housing and welfare run counter to regeneration policies. In 
addition, mainsti-eam resources need to be targeted on tiie cities and 
complement urban initiatives in that area. 
2. National and Regional Industi'ial Policy 
There needs to be a policy developed which actively encourages industry to 
develop in depressed areas and that will link effectively witii the emerging 
markets in Europe. This would entail the re-introduction of cost effective 
Regional Grant regimes and re-orientation of central govemment support to 
the industrial sector and away ft-om ttie service sector. 
3. Increase in loca l Democracy 
Reduction in local democracy has been cleariy evident over the past 15 years 
and must be addressed if local authorities are to operate effectively again at 
tiie local level. Local authorities need to be adequately empowered and 
resourced to act as local situations demand and address deprivation in their 
areas. 
4. Central/Local Relations 
Central government should again view local govemment as the local arm of 
government reacting effectively to local variation. This may take the fomi of 
the 'Contracts de Ville' in France, whereby the two parties enter into a specific 
contract to implement certain policies. Whilst City Challenge has achieved 
tills in some way, the various tiers of government should begin to develop a 
strategic approach. 
Within these broad aims outiined above (and they are by no means exhaustive) 
could operate an effective range of urban policies. Outiined below are a number of 
106 
issues, that have been discussed before, but nevertheless are central to urban 
policy being able to address the needs and problems of inner city residents. 
1. Sti-ategic Approach 
Urban policy must cleariy relate to and complement the wider policy 
framework and vice versa. The priorities of ttie various levels of govemment, 
European, National, Regional and local must be co-ordinated for urban policy 
action to be effective. 
2. Local Leadership 
Democratic institutions must be sti-engthened, power redirected away from 
Quangos and a direct link made between local authorities and tiiose agencies 
undertaking regeneration. Power needs to be finnly re-directed to the hands 
of local authorities. 
3. Long Tenn Commitment 
UrtDan policy needs to be long term and co-ordinated in nature. The 
resti-ictions and uncertainties created by annual funding regimes needs to be 
replaced by long term strategically developed policies with cleariy identifiable 
aims and objectives. 
4. Adequate and Appropriate Resourcing 
Both the public and private sector need to re-invest in the long term future of 
the cities. There is a need to co-ordinate better public and private spending 
and remove restrictions which deny local authorities the ability to bon'ow 
money. Additionally, gaps left by the UrtDan Programme need to be 
addressed and revenue, rattier than capital investment, made available. 
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5. Need not Beauty 
Resources must be allocated on the basis of levels of deprivation and need in 
an area not, as City Challenge and SRB resources are, allocated on tiie 
basis of competition. Resources also need to be allocated with an 'urtDan 
bias' and not generally as is the case with SRB funding. 
6. Partnership 
Whilst the concept of 'partnership' has been misused extensively over the 
past 15 years, there is a definite need for a variety of actors to wori< togetiier 
in the pursuit of regeneration. The success of tills relies on the equality of 
power between the public, private, voluntary and community sectors. City 
Challenge has attempted to achieve this but evidence suggests that a limited 
timescale and lack of adequate resourcing have often prevented communities 
participating in tiie partnership in a meaningful way. 
7. Community Empowerment and People Based 
UrtDan policy should be people based and should be inclusive. The role of 
the voluntary and community groups is essential in mobilising local people to 
achieve sustainable action and develop people's aspirations and talents. 
There is a need for 'bottom up strategies' to identify what people need/want 
and develop these ideas (through support and action) so that people can 
own and direct action. A real commitinent to community based activity and 
community empowennent are essential parts of any urtjan policy. That said, 
in the current political climate it is not regarded as politically expedient to be 
seen to be giving the poor what they want. 
It is clear that until govemment are prepared to create a framework which addresses 
the needs of deskilled, poor and economically marginalised communities, cities will 
remain unstable and long term sustainable regeneration will remain unobtainable. 
Whilst it would be naive to assume high levels of resources would solve the urtDan 
problem alone, the effective targeting of resources in a co-ordinated effort to 
ameliorate inner city problems is cleariy the most appropriate way to proceed. A long 
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term approach producing a long term effect - needs to be developed with the major 
stake holders in the area - local people. Urban policy must be adequately and 
appropriately resourced, administered by a local democratic institution which clearly 
appreciates its position in relation to central govemment, other local agencies but 
most importantly local people. Few of these requirements actually exist today. 
Whilst recommending what urban policy should be is a relatively easy task, it must 
be clearly acknowledged that in the cun-ent political context demands for equitable 
regeneration, administered through devolved power structures responsive to local 
need will be received by the govemment, at least, with little enthusiasm. Until there is 
a sea change In attitudes toward urban policy (not necessarily guaranteed by a 
change of govemment) urban policy will continue to be outside the control of local 
authorities and remain largely in-elevant to local people; certain groups in society will 
continue to be further marginalised in distinct areas. 
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